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ABSTRACT 
Nietzsche‘s concept of eternal return best exemplifies his anti-theological thought, but it is 
often misread as either classical physics or a thought experiment. Insofar as Anglo-American 
and analytic interpretations reject eternal return‘s cosmology, their ethical implications are 
minimized. By contrast, Heidegger‘s synthesized cosmological and ethical reading is shown 
to be more normatively significant in framing Nietzsche‘s philosophy as radical atheism. 
However, it is also shown that Heidegger limits Nietzsche‘s radicalness by approaching 
eternal return as the notion that being as a whole returns identically. To that end, it is next 
argued that Heidegger‘s explication of the cosmology as an ethical projection is superior to 
scientific interpretations in analytic and Anglo-American readings, but also that Heidegger 
partially misreads eternal return‘s cosmology. It is therefore finally demonstrated that 
Nietzsche‘s cosmology actually rejects that an identical state of being returns. This finally 
allows for the most profound ethical implications in Nietzsche‘s philosophy. 
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Chapter 1: The Eternal Return of the Same as an Ethical Doctrine 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
If God is dead, what is the nature of the knife in the hands of his killers? What structuration 
of the world would best epitomize the death of God, and even possibly make that death a 
cause for celebration? The answer may lie in the eternal return. By first understanding the 
merits and limitations of Heidegger‘s interpretation of the metaphysico-cosmological 
structure of eternal return and the implications that follow from it, we stand to place ourselves 
in a much better position to understand how Nietzsche‘s doctrine should be read. As we will 
see later, cosmological interpretations of eternal return are marginalized readings and 
constitute an area of the doctrine that tends to be harshly dismissed. The enduring strength of 
Heidegger‘s account is that it builds a totalizing vision of an atheist worldview that amounts 
to an ambitious assault on a perceived nihilism at the center of historical philosophy. Over the 
course of this analysis, I will try to show that failing to interpret eternal return‘s cosmology as 
a theory against the tradition of theology, or simply ignoring the cosmological details and 
focusing on eternal return purely as a thought experiment obfuscates its significance as a 
doctrine. The end result, I will hope to show, would be a version of Nietzsche that is pale and 
sickly next to what he should be. It is my hope that I can show how Heidegger paves the way 
for an account of eternal return that illustrates its full normative impact qua a philosophy of 
atheism. Nonetheless, in the end it will also need to be shown that his account doesn‘t go far 
enough. Hence, I will also argue that because Heidegger still interprets eternal return as the 
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return of the same, he finally deprives eternal return of the full normative impact it ought to 
have. 
1.2 THE ALLEGED IMPORTANCE OF ETERNAL RETURN 
As we will see a bit more clearly later, Heidegger interprets eternal return as 
Nietzsche's claim that all events return identically throughout eternity (Heidegger, 1984, p. 
109). In comparing Heidegger‘s account to popular analytic and Anglo-American 
interpretations, at least one factor will render it simple. As we will see from here on out, most 
readings likewise interpret eternal return as the return of the same. However, Heidegger is 
distinct for the degree to which he repeatedly emphasizes eternal return‘s widespread 
importance. Heidegger directs our attention to Nietzsche‘s exact placement of the doctrine‘s 
first appearance in The Gay Science. The first communication of eternal return is followed by 
an aphorism bearing the ever so provocative title Incipit tragoedia – the tragedy begins. 
Heidegger declares that with the thought of eternal return, ―[t]he tragic as such becomes the 
fundamental trait of beings‖ (Ibid., p. 28). Heidegger defines the tragic in Nietzsche as the 
convergence and affirmation of elements previously constructed as mutually opposing terms. 
As Heidegger puts it, ―[t]he terrifying is what is affirmed; indeed, affirmed in its unalterable 
affiliation with the beautiful‖ (Ibid., p. 29). Heidegger‘s claim is not without textual evidence 
from Nietzsche‘s work either. When Nietzsche asks in The Gay Science what makes one 
heroic, indeed he responds, ―Going out to meet one‘s supreme suffering and supreme hope 
alike‖ (1974, §268). 
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Before we wrestle with the cosmology then, it will help to examine if we should really 
care about eternal return. I believe that the significance of eternal return as an ethical doctrine 
can be divided into two main categories that it impacts. The first category is philosophy as a 
whole. The last and most important implication involves one‘s experience of the world in 
relation to philosophy as a whole, or that is to say in relation to the world as philosophy 
might theorize it through the eternal return 
1.3 FIRST PRESENTATION OF ETERNAL RETURN 
Interpretations of what the eternal return means typically echo Nietzsche‘s first 
presentation of the doctrine in The Gay Science in which no reference to any cosmology has 
yet been made (1974, §341): 
The greatest burden. –What would happen if one day or night a demon went to steal upon you in your 
loneliest loneliness and say to you, ―You will have to live this life - as you are living it now and have lived 
it in the past - once again and countless times more; and there will be nothing new to it, but every pain and 
every pleasure, every thought and sigh, and everything unutterably petty or grand in your life will have to 
come back to you, all in the same sequence and order – and even this spider, and that moonlight between 
the trees, even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence turning over and over – and 
you with it, speck of dust!‖ Would you not cast yourself down, gnash your teeth, and curse the demon who 
said these things? Or have you ever experienced a tremendous moment when you would reply to him, 
―You are a god; never have I heard anything more godly!‖ If that thought ever came to prevail in you, it 
would transform you, such as you are, and perhaps it would mangle you. The question posed to each thing 
you do, ―Do you will this once more and countless times more?‖ would weigh upon your actions as the 
greatest burden! Or how beneficent would you have to become toward yourself and toward life to demand 
nothing more than this eternal sanction and seal? – 
The above passage, which to my eyes represents some of Nietzsche‘s most chilling and 
powerful words, presents a devastating challenge that eternal return is to pose to the 
individual. The basic premise in this first presentation of eternal return invites the reader to 
imagine that they will (and have) relived the exact same life forever. In this hypothetical 
scenario, absolutely everything in world history, including one‘s individual life as it unfolds 
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from birth until death, will return as is. For the sake of argument, let us take the idea literally 
for now to explore some of the implications of such a concept on the world in general. I will 
then try to connect that to some imagined implications on one‘s personal life in a world 
where eternal return is thought of as real. 
1.4 IMPLICATIONS OF ETERNAL RETURN ON A PHILOSOPHICAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD 
Eternal return has immediate implications for how we think of being as a whole. Karl 
Lowith pinpoints eternal return‘s unequivocal opposition to the following: 
―…the Christian era when man believed in a progressive history determined by an absolute beginning and 
end, by creation and original sin at one end, consummation and last judgment at the other end - both 
eventually secularized into the modern idea of an indefinite progress from primitive backwardness to 
civilized progressiveness‖ (1945, p. 278). 
Eternal return, with neither beginning nor end, represents the total teleological 
suspension of Progress. It is an overt revolt against this Christian, and later secularized, 
notion of successive epochal approximations of a utopian goal or culminating stage of world 
history. If everything returns exactly as it was and is, there can be no end to build to – there 
can be no culminating event, and thus there is simply life without (teleological) purpose. At 
least with certain interpretations of the Christian idea, one might say we are playing out the 
origin leading to a worldwide event of Armageddon. That would at least constitute a 
powerful meaning to existence, albeit for many a dark and frightening one. By contrast, 
without the hope of approximating to any utopian ideal or even any end times, there is simply 
life as a static form of being. As a static form of being, life can no longer unfold with any 
narrative that has an identifiable beginning or end from which meaning could be ascribed to 
human life. The absolute arbitrariness of life may here be the basis of dread. 
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1.5 ETERNAL RETURN AND AGENCY 
Of course, it is not just the world at a distance that is impacted, but rather the individual‘s 
everyday life as well. This presentation of eternal return becomes powerful with a conscious 
awareness of its implications on individual agency. To understand why this must be so, let us 
briefly understand the concept of a choice. The concept of making any choice presupposes 
the belief in some degree of agency for the individual, or else the very notion is incoherent. 
To attribute the concept of decision-making to a person presupposes accepting the possibility 
of a range of possible choices in most situations. Such an understanding of choice, however, 
is impossible under this construal of eternal return because reality is ―full‖ and complete – 
there is no logical space for the incoming of spontaneous events. There is no such thing as the 
possibility of a genuine alternative in any situation where I seem to have acted spontaneously, 
as this has been precluded by a hard determinism. As Ivan Soll writes, ―[T]his version of the 
doctrine commits you to repeat ad infinitum all the logically possible alternative choices in 
every decision situation, no matter how you now choose‖ which entails the conclusion that 
one‘s choices are therefore ―robbed of significance‖ (1973, p.332). 
This notion of one reducible determination is exactly what one must reference to 
comprehend the full terrifying nature of eternal return as an ethical theory. For because I 
simultaneously know that logically speaking I have already made every possible decision 
(because I have already lived these choices an infinite number of times, and reality cannot be 
altered in this or any other time cycle), and yet I can have no memory of having done so, I 
shall proceed in full awareness that I am paradoxically equal parts spectator and executor of 
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all my actions. This aspect of eternal return demands one to psychologically come to terms 
with only seemingly making free choices in their life – all seemingly free choices would then 
be juxtaposed with an awareness of the logical impossibility of actually acting freely. In the 
words of someone who we can imagine realizing this very implication on their agency, ―I had 
bestrode the world all my life as if I were free only to be choked by the realization that I was 
not, am not, and would never be.‖ 
1.6 ETERNAL RETURN AND THE OTHER 
Eternal return might also be powerfully felt when we imagine its application to others 
with whom we share the world. We can easily imagine eternal return being the greatest 
psychological burden for those who always despise life. From the perspective of someone for 
whom life need not even necessarily be filled with a particularly inordinate abundance of 
traumatic, tragic events for it to already (and always) be lamentable, the thought of living 
through the same inherently worthless and dreadful life eternally would be enough to cause 
one agonizing pain. If someone posits that life in the world is categorically bad or not worth 
living, eternal return would seem to bring with it the punishment of precluding any dream of 
being released from existence itself. The terrifying aspect for the pessimist or despiser of life 
in general would be the lack of escape from the world of merely fleeting pleasures and 
forever-inescapable pains. 
 Eternal return is of course also dreadful and heartbreaking for others who hate their 
contingently ―bad‖ lives – those who might have loved life if their suffering was not of such 
an overwhelming degree. It is one thing for a quite satisfied person, and perhaps especially 
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one living in a peaceful and prosperous country, to imagine their life returning. It might even 
be tempting to dismiss the pessimist who hates existence writ large. Perhaps, one could think, 
it is poetic justice that one who simply hates life so be doomed to repeat it. For those who 
have suffered (or worse yet, are now suffering) egregious and uncontrollable life 
circumstances, the matter takes on a different level of complexity. There may be no worse 
fate imaginable for the most intense sufferers of the world than having to eternally live 
through the same life episodes without change. The simple fact of the matter is that we can 
certainly imagine enough scenarios where we should at the very least be sympathetic with 
someone‘s conclusion that their life was bad enough for them to not desire its exact return 
even once, let alone eternally. One who has witnessed a litany of atrocities and barely 
survived a genocidal war in their hometown might understandably find fewer things more 
repugnant to the intellect than the notion of living through such horrors eternally. 
Hinting at the dread implicit in the return of all the content of the world's history, 
Gillespie argues that the eternal return of everything therefore necessarily affirms precisely 
this totality; precisely this ―everything.‖ For Gillespie, affirming anything in eternal return 
(any moment) would therefore mean affirming even (so typically regarded) monstrous acts 
such as rape and murder of the innocent (2009, p. 32). Gillespie's logic is not in error here. 
Every Charles Manson or Adolf Hitler would return just the same as every Ralph Waldo 
Emerson or Goethe, rendering them all equal in that respect. Similarly, every instance of a 
child dying of cancer or a town full of people being slaughtered would return just the same as 
a person saving a child from a burning house or one writing a magnificent poem. Because 
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everything returns equally, would we not have to either simultaneously affirm the worst and 
most mediocre in affirming the best and most glorious or else simultaneously deny the best 
and most glorious in denying the worst and most mediocre? 
1.7 THE RETURN OF THE SMALLEST MEN 
It is also hard to deny that there is something terrible about imagining the return of an 
always long and distressing list of miserable, petty life-deniers. For Zarathustra, it is the 
return of all the smallest men
1
, all those who are bitter against life and incapable of 
affirmation that is enough to cause him great despair: 
―‘Eternally recurs the man of whom you are weary, the small man‘ – thus yawned my sadness and dragged 
its feet and could not go to sleep. Man‘s earth turned into a cave for me, its chest sunken; all that is living 
became human mold and bones and musty past to me. My sighing sat on all human tombs and could no 
longer get up; my sighing and questioning croaked and gagged and gnawed and wailed by day and night: 
‗Alas, man recurs eternally! The small man recurs eternally!‘‖ (Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ III ―The 
Convalescent‖). 
The effect of nausea or disgust will be strong regardless of how we might choose to 
understand what the ―smallest man‖ is. It will be there regardless of how we (or anyone, for 
that matter, and this would include anyone who does not even self-identify as Nietzschean in 
any strong sense), might choose to define the most mediocre, self-contented and contemptible 
type of person; whether we consider this to be someone who slavishly pursues nothing but 
material wealth, someone who is dogmatically religious, or some other acknowledged type. 
There can be no hope of ever altering or removing the lowest imaginable type from the world 
we are in. Whatever the poison may be, for the smallest man to eternally return means that 
the smallest man cannot be overcome; the poison hath no cure. 
                                                     
1
 For the sake of being faithful to a reading of Nietzsche (who was admittedly a sexist), I have retained the gendered form 
of his writing of the term. 
 9 
 
1.8 AFFIRMING THE PAST AND FUTURE 
Heidegger‘s Nietzsche, however, is unwilling to rest in despair at the thought of sharing 
all of eternity with both the horrors of history and same cast of despisers of life and small 
men alike. Heidegger focuses on a particular passage in Thus Spoke Zarathustra where 
Zarathustra speaks about the manner in which past and future relate to each other in eternal 
return: 
――Two paths meet here; no one has yet followed either to its end. This long lane stretches back for an 
eternity. And the long lane out there, that is another eternity. They contradict each other, these paths; they 
offend each other face to face; and it is here at the gateway that they come together. The name of the 
gateway is inscribed above: ‗Moment‘‖ (Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ III ―On the Vision and the Riddle‖). 
In Heidegger‘s interpretation, the nature of the collision between past and future is 
inherent in one who performs actions that are simultaneously aimed toward the future and 
already contained in the past (in other time cycles). Whenever I act in the world (our world 
now, not the world of eternal return), I am doing so with some thought of an act‘s future 
consequences whether that anticipated future consequence will be seconds-removed or 
years-removed from the act itself. We are all future-oriented in at least a minimal sense. 
However, if we accept that the totality of reality cannot be altered in eternal return, every 
act that seems to be novel has, in fact, already happened in a previous time cycle. As we 
generalize to world events, the same is true of all acts that seemingly had far-reaching 
consequences. Acts that have been regarded as triggers for world wars return just the same 
as our personal acts. 
For Heidegger, this simultaneity of past and future means crucially ―accepting and 
affirming the past‖ (1984, p. 57). Eternal return challenges one to accept the totality of the 
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world‘s past because it can never be erased, altered, or overcome in any cosmological sense. 
Because it is not simply my past that will return, but rather also the collective history of the 
world, Heidegger‘s Nietzsche holds that one cannot affirm their own life from now (as it 
progresses toward the future) without simultaneously affirming the totality of history that will 
also return. To proclaim a love of life while knowing that it affirms not just the totality of its 
joys, but also the totality of all its horrors – Heidegger‘s Nietzsche seems to deem this 
necessary to affirm that which is ugliest as that which is also beautiful. It is this affirmation 
that seems to be what Heidegger means by eternal return as the signaling of the tragic age 
(Ibid., p. 29). One must affirm both its joys and horrors lest they only ―affirm‖ life in the 
most superficial sense. In eternal return, there is of course also no future moment that will 
contain novel events, and so for Heidegger‘s Nietzsche the affirmation of past, and present, 
and future are inextricably linked by their temporal unity. This is how Heidegger can 
proclaim in his reading of Nietzsche that ―[p]ast and future run up against one another‖ 
(Ibid., p. 57). 
1.9 SELECTIVE ONTOLOGY: LOWER VERSUS HIGHER TYPES 
Nonetheless, he is ready to insist that one needn‘t affirm all particularly mediocre or 
loathsome people as if all people were rendered equal by the fact of their collective return. 
Heidegger distinguishes between the low type of human being characterized as ―fleeting‖ and 
the more rare higher types. It is worth quoting him at length here on this point so as to not 
misrepresent him in any way: 
Those who do not ―believe‖ in the [truth of the eternal return] are the ―fleeting ones.‖ By that Nietzsche 
means two things. First of all, the fleeting ones are fleeing ones, in flight before magnificent, expansive 
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prospects which presuppose an ability to wait. The fleeting ones want their happiness right there where 
they can latch onto it; and they want the time to be able to enjoy it. These people who flee are fleeting in 
yet another sense; they themselves are without stability, are transient creatures; they leave nothing behind; 
they found nothing, ground nothing (Ibid., p. 131). 
We must now juxtapose this passage with another in order to understand Heidegger‘s 
peculiar interpretation of what it means to be a fleeting type in contrast to something higher. 
Heidegger continues thus: 
The others, those who are not fleeting, are ―the human beings with eternal souls and eternal Becoming and 
pains that tell of the future.‖ We might also say that they are the human beings who bear within themselves 
a great deal of time and who live to the full the times they have – a matter that is quite independent of 
actual longevity. Or, to turn it around the other way: it is precisely the fleeting human being who is least fit 
to serve as the human being of proper transition, though appearances seem to suggest the opposite, 
inasmuch as ―transition‖ implies evanescence. The fleeting ones, who do not and cannot think the thought, 
―must, according to their own nature, finally die off!‖ ―Only those who hold their existence to be capable 
of eternal repetition will remain: and with such people a condition is possible to which no utopian has ever 
attained!‖ (Ibid., p. 131). 
As Alexander Cooke notes, Heidegger emphasizes the possibility of one ―hearing‖ the 
eternal return as the basis of an ontological determination (2005, p. 23). Those who cannot 
affirm the thought of their lives returning eternally are deemed inferior. Although everyone 
necessarily returns, Heidegger‘s Nietzsche is here arguing that not everyone returns equal - 
one‘s personal reaction to the thought of return corresponds to an ontological determination 
of their being as a person (as belonging either to a higher or lower type).  
Heidegger‘s strategy is to talk about eternal return as selective ontology. With talk of 
―hearing‖ the eternal return, Heidegger is referring to what it means to fully comprehend the 
implications that eternal return poses to one‘s life. When Heidegger writes that ―only the few, 
the rare‖ (1984, p. 28) will be capable of fully thinking through the concept of eternal return, 
he means that only a select few will be capable of understanding and affirming the 
implications that eternal return is to pose - eternal return determines the ontology of the 
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person who confronts it and therefore presupposes ontological inequality. ―Never make equal 
what is unequal‖ (Nietzsche, 1990, TI ―Expeditions of an Untimely Man‖ 48). Heidegger 
goes on further to claim that even Nietzsche was incapable of affirming eternal return 
completely, and that Nietzsche therefore had to construct the character of Zarathustra for 
whom the thought of eternal return is finally affirmed and celebrated fully. ―The thought of 
eternal return of the same is so much the hardest to bear that no prior, mediocre human being 
can think it; he dare not even register a claim to think it; and that holds for Nietzsche himself‖ 
(Heidegger, 1984, p. 30). It is at least clear then that Heidegger upholds Zarathustra as one 
who is worthy of being considered among the highest, most admirable possible types. 
Heidegger seems to have in mind then an element of hierarchy related to the thought of 
eternal return. 
1.10 THE DECISION CRITERION 
Heidegger‘s distinction between higher and lower individuals becomes clearer 
through his explanation of the importance of decision-making. Heidegger asserts, ―The 
decisive condition is you yourself, that is to say, the manner in which you achieve your self 
by becoming your own master…‖ (Ibid., p. 138). Heidegger‘s claim is that acts in the eternal 
return either affirm or negate the thought of eternal return itself in decisive moments. The 
return of everything precludes any new determinations, so neither affirmation nor negation 
derive from the concept of novel actions and their consequences. For Heidegger, what 
remains in affirming eternal return is the possibility of possessing the will to create the 
totality of one's life in particular present moments. But let us not get lost now in ambiguities. 
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What does it really mean to create a totality of one‘s life in a moment? According to 
Heidegger, it means to recognize that whatever one is as an individual in a singular moment 
contains within itself the potential to embody a thematic totality of who they are, were, and 
will be in all of eternity. As a thematic totality, one‘s life can be regarded (by oneself) as 
encompassing a grand unfolding narrative with describable qualities that best embodied who 
one was as a person – much like how we can all reflect on complex figures in literature or 
television and film (be it Hamlet or Luke Skywalker) and reduce them to a succinct list of 
dominant personality traits or behavioral patterns that epitomizes the essence of their 
characters. As Heidegger phrases it, ―If you allow your existence to drift in timorousness and 
ignorance, with all the consequences these things have, then they will come again, and they 
will be that which already was‖ (Ibid., pp. 135-36). Heidegger is hinting at using the thought 
of eternal return as a vehicle by which to regard one‘s life as a narrative that one could be 
proud of upon reflection when they consider that this narrative has the seal of eternity upon it. 
In other words, overarching themes under which one self-identifies in this lifetime, by virtue 
of the cognizance of their eternal return, can create a totalizing identity for oneself. In 
Heidegger‘s example, one will therefore have affirmed timorousness and ignorance as 
totalizing themes or characteristics of their identity. There is meant to be a sense of 
importance added to my life when I understand that the story of my life will return as is, as if 
Heidegger‘s Nietzsche is using the thought of eternal return as a warning to not create a 
contemptible life story that will signify what one was as a person - forever.  
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Implicit in such awareness then would be something like a decision criterion where I 
feel compelled to make certain superior choices for my life and avoid behavior of a timorous 
or ignorant nature and the associated thought of such life patterns defining me as a person 
forever. Awareness of eternal return then means having the will to create for oneself. To arm 
oneself against the dreaded thought of one‘s life being definable in mediocre or contemptible 
ways (as ignorant, timorous, etcetera), Heidegger‘s Nietzsche invites us to live with greater 
urgency and care for the type of person we can honestly consider ourselves to be. As 
Heidegger says, ―And if on the contrary you shape something supreme out of the next 
moment, as out of every moment, and if you note well and retain the consequences, then this 
moment will come again and will have been what already was‖ (Ibid., pp. 135-36). The 
implication is that one represents for all eternity whatever one was able to create for their 
individual self in this particular cycle of eternity. Any meaning for oneself that I have the will 
to create within significant moments is done so in moments that simultaneously represent all 
moments of eternity. ―Oh, that you would put from you all half willing, and decide upon 
lethargy as you do upon action. Oh that you understood my saying: ‗Always do what you will 
– but first be such as can will!‘‖ (Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ III ―Of the Virtue That Makes 
Small‖). These descriptions of ―shaping something supreme‖ in a moment seem intentionally 
under-determined in Heidegger‘s writing. This is all the better for his interpretation - to 
overly specify what counts as a moment of creation would be to betray the notion of an 
individual creating for themselves; of truly having a will to create subjective notions of 
existential profundity or significance. Such willed creative moments would seem to be 
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entirely subjective and include anything then: seizing the courage to apply a radical idea or 
principle in a situation where all are in blissful conformity, writing counter-intuitive and 
politically radical scholarly works, or something as simple as experiencing a thought of awe 
rather than monotony during the first rain of Spring. Regardless, any one of these moments 
will therefore embody its meaning eternally by virtue of the fact that, as Bernd Magnus also 
notes, each present or ―now‖ in eternal return is eternalized (1978, pp. 111-154). 
We find a consonant view with some Anglo-American thinkers. Ivan Soll is, as far as I 
know, the first Nietzsche commentator on the analytic side to argue for what is now a 
common interpretation of eternal return as a decision criterion (Soll, 1973, pp. 322-23). 
2
 
Similar to Heidegger, Soll sums it up as a practical imperative that adds importance to one‘s 
actions by compelling the individual to perform only those actions that one would at the same 
time perform eternally. Soll reads Nietzsche as claiming that eternal return can either 
devastate us or inspire us. If we take heed of the thought that every action we performed 
would be ineradicable (because it would return forever), this notion (of each action‘s 
recurring finality) might motivate us to act differently. That is to say, the thought that an act 
returns forever can give us greater pause when we consider the worthiness of an act – 
whether or not, given that awareness, we still want to perform a given act can reveal that it is 
(from our viewpoint) the best possible choice to make in a given situation. On the other hand, 
an awareness of the return of my life may psychologically motivate me to perform more 
                                                     
2
 We see this view prevail, for instance, in Brian Leiter (2002, pp. 119-20), and Bernard Reginster (2006, p. 223). Bernard 
Reginster, for instance, claims of eternal return that “*I+t is invoked to formulate a practical imperative and to point to a 
specific substantive ethical ideal” (2006, p. 223). Also, although he does not belong to the Anglo-American tradition as such, 
we find a very similar view in Keith Ansell-Pearson (1991, pp. 176ff.) 
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meaningful acts for my life; it might motivate me to act such that I fill my life with more 
joyous experiences and a greater abundance of (what I regard as) important or purposeful 
activities (Ibid.).  
Let me add that by now it should be clear that there are two qualitatively different sets 
of acts with which to interpret such a formula. First of all, if all of my personal acts will be 
repeated an infinite number of times (and have therefore also been repeated already), this 
means that innocuous or meaningless acts like making a sandwich, taking money out of the 
ATM, and using the washroom are also necessarily implicated. Nonetheless, choosing from 
within this first set of acts is unlikely to make one feel strongly about the totality of their 
existence; such moments already pass by largely unnoticed for the vast majority of people. 
Rather, such acts only usually matter negatively. For most, it is only by virtue of not choosing 
to spend too many days watching insipid television programs or sitting around eating junk 
food that the decision criterion is significant for considering such otherwise mundane 
scenarios. It seems implicit within such an imperative of the will to create then that it is to 
apply to only a certain set of acts positively – the imperative, again, is to positively act so as 
to create moments deemed significant to the individual, whatever these may be from any 
subjective point of view.
3
 
Regardless of the subjective nature of what constitutes a significant or beautiful 
moment, knowing that I am to live the same life again ad infinitum is supposed to act as a 
                                                     
3
 By the logic of Heidegger’s Nietzsche, with its under-determined definition of what constitutes something supreme, 
would we have to grant that for some rare individuals, watching television or even gorging on snacks could be construed as 
profound? How might we further distinguish acts of the fleeting versus rare types? This question could warrant further 
investigation. 
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constant intrinsic motivator to construct my life with greater attention to willing certain 
actions that create memorable, joyous experiences (or in the narrowed Heideggerian sense, 
that create a means by which to define and ―master‖ oneself). Notice here the implicit 
premise. By focusing on the psychological awareness of each act returning as a means of 
augmenting the importance of each seeming choice, the implicit premise is that the awareness 
of an act‘s eternal return augments its importance. Even though there is no memory of one‘s 
total lived experience (in this interpretation of eternal return, I do not know how much longer 
I end up living, or what happens to myself or the world around me before I die), one is 
supposed to be motivated by the sheer notion that whatever life one ends up living will be 
recorded in eternity forever. Living the most joyous life possible would then theoretically 
turn the ugly nature of the condition of eternal sameness into a heavenly proposition, as I 
could rest content knowing I had just lived my life as if I had constructed an eternal (literally 
eternal) work of art. 
1.11 THE PROBLEM WITH ANGLO-AMERICAN DECISION CRITERION 
THEORIES 
Both Heidegger and the aforementioned thinkers may share similar views of eternal 
return as a type of decision criterion, but a very key difference separates them. While, as we 
will see later, Heidegger expounds a cosmology in Nietzsche‘s work with which to defend 
eternal return as a physical doctrine, Soll (1973, pp. 322-23) and the like do not. While we 
will understand their reasons for rejecting the cosmology when we turn to that section later, 
for now it will suffice to note just how standard it is for the cosmology to be rejected. Bernd 
Magnus, who writes that ―eternal return intensifies the dynamics of choice, because whatever 
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I choose to be, that I shall be for infinite recurrences‖ also commits himself to attempting to 
make eternal return ―utterly indifferent to the truth value of the doctrine‖ (1978, pp. 
111-154). Very similarly, Bernard Reginster clings to the notion of a ―practical 
interpretation‖ as a merely ethical theory (2006, p. 223), and Georg Simmel also denies the 
cosmology of eternal return but still holds to a decision criterion in the doctrine (1991, pp. 
170-72). 
This intention to read eternal return purely as an ethical doctrine does irreparable 
harm to its normative power as a decision criterion. I agree with Maudemarie Clark who 
argues that the very thought of eternal return can only make certain acts more significant if 
the actual theory of eternal return ―is or may be true‖ (1990, p. 252). She rightly adds that 
claiming Nietzsche proposes a decision criterion requires interpreting him as being concerned 
with the truth of eternal return‘s cosmology (Ibid., p. 252). The psychological effect of 
knowing every act returns can only be intensified if I believe that the act will return, or if I 
have some reason to think my belief is true. Ivan Soll claims, ―[I]f consideration of the mere 
possibility of eternal return can psychologically involve ―the greatest burden,‖ the importance 
of any proof of the doctrine‘s truth is diminished‖ (1973, p. 325). That being said, the less I 
believe in the doctrine as a distinct possibility, the less meaningful it quickly becomes. 
Otherwise, merely imagining it to be the case entails a rather superfluous decision criterion. 
The merely hypothetical scenario that my every decided act would return entails caring about 
each future act no more than (for this atheist writer, and for many Christians for that matter) 
the purely hypothetical scenario of an afterlife in Hell where I would suffer indescribable 
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agonies and burn alive forever for having failed to act as a pious Christian and confess my 
sins. 
It may be counter-objected that Nietzsche himself writes of the psychological power 
of possibility. Nietzsche does state in one of his notes, ―Even the thought of a possibility can 
shake us and transform us; it is not merely sensations or particular expectations that can do 
that! Note how effective the possibility of eternal damnation was!‖ (1881, XII, number 65). It 
is true enough that the possibility of eternal damnation even today is still probably effective 
and terrifying for certain believers, but there is an obvious difference between a possibility 
that is strongly considered and internalized (even without definite proof, or on strong faith 
alone) and one that is only casually imagined and dismissed as fantasy. Even consideration of 
eternal damnation as a possibility at least comes at the conclusion of a certain cosmology that 
is learned, however elementary the interpretation of scripture may be (an almighty creator 
who threatens eternal punishment if certain moral rules are not strictly obeyed, etc.). If 
eternal return‘s cosmology is ignored or refuted, its basis as a decision criterion is evacuated 
of any urgency. 
1.12 MERITS AND LIMITATIONS OF AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF ETERNAL 
RETURN AS AN IDEAL 
Clark offers an alternative ethical interpretation for the individual that is not so 
obviously harmed by its rejection of any cosmology. Clark references the same passage in 
The Gay Science to suggest that we use the hypothetical scenario of eternal return strictly as a 
conceptual device to retrospectively assess the attitudes we have developed. These ―attitudes‖ 
here refer to our thoughts on life as a whole – the extent to which we find life worth living 
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amidst our experiences with both joy and suffering. As she puts it, eternal return is an ideal to 
―become the kind of person who, in the situation described, would consider the demon‘s 
message divine‖ (1990, p. 248). If we respond to the demon‘s message with enthusiastic joy, 
it reflects a life-affirming, positive attitude toward ourselves and the lives we have lived. On 
the other hand, despondent misery or outrage at such a proposal would imply a self-loathing 
attitude or hostile disposition toward life (Ibid., p. 251). Clark‘s idea then is to utilize eternal 
return as a mirror into one‘s disposition toward life. This involves imagining eternal return in 
a strictly pre-analytical way, or ―suspending all doubts concerning its truth or conceivability‖ 
(Ibid., p. 268/270). 
Clark‘s interpretation avoids the immediate pitfalls of the Anglo-American thinkers‘ 
decision criterion theories, as it does not require eternal return to be actually or even possibly 
true. Even so, as an interpretation of eternal return‘s ethical consequences, I find it somewhat 
wanting. As (nothing more than) a test of one‘s disposition toward life, eternal return‘s scope 
is extremely limited as a result. Such a focus on the individual‘s disposition therefore has no 
application at all to the other or being as a whole. However, even just from the perspective of 
an individual, it renders the doctrine anticlimactic given how Nietzsche describes it. ―The 
thought and belief is a burden which, in comparison with all other weights, oppresses you far 
more than they do‖ (Nietzsche quoted in Heidegger, 1984, p. 122). Why would a mere ideal 
be so much worse than any other burdensome thing I could think or believe? That would 
seem dramatic even for Nietzsche. What‘s more, although it is still true that one could in 
principle utilize the demon‘s message as a reflective test of our feelings about existence in 
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addition to something like a decision criterion, it is certainly not self-evident that it succeeds 
more strongly qua a test of our feelings than imagining the most typical following scenario: 
that this life I have lived thus far will be the only life I will ever have the chance to live. It is 
not obvious to me that eternal return, as no more than an ideal, is a substantially more 
powerful means of assessing my feelings about life than my reaction to the thought that I will 
be no more than a corpse beneath the soil for all eternity once I have breathed my last breath 
and thought my last thought. 
1.13 THE HIGHEST SIGNIFICANCE OF HEIDEGGER’S DECISION CRITERION: 
AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF NIHILISM IN PHILOSOPHY 
While Heidegger‘s reading escapes the problems we saw associated with divorcing the 
decision criterion from eternal return‘s possible or actual truth (because he at least has a 
cosmology to underlie his decision criterion), I believe a similar criticism of Clark could still 
apply to his and perhaps any other decision criterion concepts in general. Similar to what I 
have said against Clark‘s reading of eternal return solely as an ethical ideal, it is not clear to 
me that focusing on the thought of living the same life innumerable times should be a 
substantially more powerful intrinsic motivator for my life decisions than the notion of living 
only one life and then departing from existence into nothingness. It seems to me somewhat 
more of an assertion that the thought of living the same life forever should be more 
determinative of preferential life choices than that of having only one precious chance to live 
any life at all.
4
 Fortunately, the Heidegger reading goes much further than motivating certain 
                                                     
4
 This could be a good topic for a separate paper. The question would concern which is more intrinsically motivating for 
creating the best possible life for oneself – the thought that one’s life choices shall return as a reflection of the choices 
they’ve made throughout eternity versus the thought that one will only have one chance to make certain life choices until 
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choices in our everyday decision-making solely on the basis of their permanence. We saw 
earlier a consonance between Heidegger and the other commentators regarding 
decision-making and the amplified importance of acts, but this could imply to the reader that 
locating other Nietzsche scholars‘ versions of the decision criterion within a Nietzschean 
cosmology (as Heidegger does) would effectively serve to put their decision criterion theories 
on equal footing with the implications found in Heidegger’s decision criterion. On the 
contrary, I believe Heidegger‘s decision criterion goes importantly beyond these other 
commentators and contains a more important implication, a more profound basis for 
affirming one‘s actions, than what we have thus far discussed. 
Heidegger locates what I believe are the most significant, because most far-reaching, 
consequences of affirming eternal return by arguing that eternal return, against the sweeping 
tradition of Platonism (and later almost all philosophy), represents the struggle against 
nihilism writ large. A brief understanding of the combined readings of Heidegger and 
Nietzsche‘s arguments about the origins and history of nihilism in Western thought will be 
useful for helping us better understand the connection Heidegger‘s Nietzsche makes between 
nihilism and decision-making. 
Heidegger offers a useful description of nihilism for now as the negation of being as a 
whole (1984, p. 173). What it means for being as a whole to be negated will become clearer 
as we cover Heidegger‘s explanation of Platonism and its effects on Western philosophy. For 
now, we can say that Nietzsche believes being as a whole is negated – or closer to how he‘d 
                                                                                                                                                                     
they are vanquished by death. Is the return, for instance, of a truly terrible life decision more terrible than the thought of 
wasting an opportunity for a better choice that therefore disappears forever? 
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phrase it, that life is rejected - insofar as our transient world is judged to be bad in some way. 
For Nietzsche, this means that the delights and joys in the elements of becoming - sensuality, 
creativity, destruction and change - are stifled, shamed and consequently drained in favour of 
unchanging ideas of truth. Nietzsche believes, ―The will to semblance, to illusion, to 
deception, to Becoming and change is deeper, more ‗metaphysical,‘ than the will to truth, to 
reality, to Being‖ (Nietzsche quoted in Heidegger, 1984, p. 74). When Nietzsche references 
―the true‖ here, he is referencing the true in the Platonic sense of a supersensuous realm of 
Ideas. 
How does all of this relate to how philosophy structures the world through its theories? 
In an important passage, Heidegger says that Platonism is the defining philosophy of the west 
for its distinction between the privileged world of Ideas and the world of appearance, change 
and death that we actually experience as embodied persons. For Heidegger, in Platonism the 
former represents the world of Being, and the latter, the world of Becoming. 
As Heidegger claims in his own philosophical observations, Platonism begins the 
tradition of conceiving the Being of beings in terms of the permanence of presence (1984, p. 
162). Insofar as the transcendental realm of Ideas is infinite, or true and real by virtue only of 
itself, it is superior. Such a tradition, Nietzsche claims, will privilege the unchanging realm, 
the world of Being, for its stable and enduring character as that which is real. The sensuous 
world, the world of Becoming, can then only be an inferior manifestation of true Being that, 
because it is subject to things like decay, flaws, and death, always distorts the perfect form of 
every being.  
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By further implication, Nietzsche also argues that the world of Becoming, or what we 
may call life or the world we experience, is debased under Platonism. It is reduced to being 
dependent on the world of Being for its truth, which means it is judged as inferior to what is 
truly real. That which is real, in this case, is the form or essence of singular beings. What 
makes life inferior are the powers or forces (the exact term does not matter for now) of a 
finite world that inevitably bring imperfection, destruction, and death. A denial to any degree 
of these forces or phenomena is tantamount to denying life entirely given that all such forces 
(creative and destructive) found within the world of Becoming are inevitably part of make 
life what it definitively is. Nietzsche summarizes it poignantly: 
They kill, they stuff, when they worship, these conceptual idolaters – they become a mortal danger to 
everything when they worship. Death, change, age, as well as procreation and growth, are for them 
objections – refutations even. What is, does not become; what becomes, is not… (1990, TI ―‘Reason‘ in 
Philosophy‖ 1). 
In Heidegger‘s estimation, Platonism stands as the strongest conditioning systematic 
worldview that determines how subsequent philosophies evaluate and conceptualize the 
world. Platonism remains ―determinative inasmuch as philosophy posits specific conditions 
for the possibility of being as a whole and for man as being within this whole. Such 
conditions set their seal on being. That which first and last obtains, that which accordingly 
constitutes the condition of ―life‖ as such, Nietzsche calls value.‖ (Heidegger, 1984, p. 171). 
Every philosophical worldview is a valuation about life that it founds itself upon, and for 
Nietzsche nihilism is the defining value (though a purely negative value) that plagues the 
history of Western thought since the popularization of the two-world doctrine (reality versus 
appearance, or a world of Being versus a world of Becoming). Nihilism, as we stated at the 
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onset of this section, is consequently the negation of being as a whole. It is a value about the 
worthlessness of transient life; the founding value of Western philosophy that essentially says 
―No‖ to life. It is, as Heidegger calls it, ―the fundamental development of history as such‖ 
that is later popularized and propounded by religious thought and the bodies of work of 
philosophy that are influenced by it (Ibid., p. 174). When the world of Becoming is implicitly 
deemed inferior for the qualities (like suffering, change and destruction) that deprive it of 
perfection and stability, such an influence renders the same final judgement about life, as 
Nietzsche understands it. ―In every age the wisest have passed the identical judgement on 
life: it is worthless‖ (Nietzsche, 1990, TI ―The Problem of Socrates‖ 1). In every such case 
then where Nietzsche believes a concept implies this sentiment, implies its nihilistic value 
about the worthlessness of life (such as in the two-world doctrine), he will reject it on that 
very basis. 
Although one might laugh at the very idea of explaining why an historically entrenched 
nihilism is dreadful (what good things, after all, could possibly follow from the belief that life 
is worthless?), Nietzsche provides interesting details of specific implications that he believes 
our thoroughly nihilistic history has left us. An understanding of these implications will also 
serve to highlight the significance of Heidegger connecting his decision criterion to the 
struggle against nihilism. To that end, Gilles Deleuze provides a helpful outline of the 
different stages of nihilism (and their debilitating effects) explained in Nietzsche‘s work. 
Negative nihilism means the immediate consequence of life taking on a purely 
negative value. This happens, as we saw, by the positing of values that are deemed higher 
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than life – ―fictions‖ (articles of faith or pure reason beyond the transient world) like the most 
overt theological ideas of God as well as similarly structured ―other-worldly‖ notions like the 
realm of forms, etc. where a supersensible realm is real beyond the immediate world and 
takes logical and ethical priority over the immediate world. The transient, natural world of 
actuality becomes mere appearance in comparison, a comparative fiction, and thus these 
values are implicitly conceived as superior to the appearances and imperfections we 
encounter in daily life. ―Values superior to life are inseparable from their effect: the 
depreciation of life, the negation of the world‖ (Deleuze, 1983, p. 147). To conceive of the 
superiority of a ―true‖ world bequeathing knowledge, goodness, and perfection beyond the 
transient world presupposes a degree of contemptibility for life. ―[T]his entire fictional world 
has its roots in hatred of the natural (- actuality! -)‖ (Nietzsche, 1990, AC 15). The transient 
world, a place of comparative deception, wickedness, and ugliness is now as inferior to the 
totality of these higher values as the totality of higher values is superior to it. In 
contradistinction to the affirmative will to create found in Heidegger‘s Nietzsche, the creation 
of a superior other-world presupposes a will to nothingness. A will to nothingness is life 
becoming aversive to itself - a rejection of life as anything that could be worthwhile (life is 
nothing, empty), and a denial of the transient world as a basis for willing any positive 
meaning in one‘s existence. The will turns against life inasmuch as it wants its ideas to 
presuppose permanence rather than transience. It is not a case of non-willing, but rather a 
type of willing that is nihilistic in kind. Nietzsche says as much when he writes, ―. . . a will to 
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nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of 
life; but it is and remains a will!‖ (1990, GM III 28). 
It is philosophy as a whole that retains the theological character of a world that is 
depreciated in the name of values antithetical to life. The picture becomes complicated with 
Nietzsche‘s famous announcement that God is dead (and we, the once pious societies of the 
past, have ―killed‖ him) (Nietzsche, 1974, GS §125), signifying that these higher values are 
no longer believed in with the same strength of conviction and piety, or are at least no longer 
as determinative of the conscious self-identification of the social subject (such as we see in 
the secularization of European societies during the Enlightenment period and onward). This 
second, reactive nihilism, reacts by trying to create new values in its place; values like the 
utilitarian project of securing maximal happiness (or goodness, or any other variation) for the 
greatest number, epochal human progress through practical reason, and other such theories 
that attempt to be recognized as universal and necessary truths. Hence, Nietzsche claims we 
are left now with the last men of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. ―Let me speak to them of what is 
most contemptible: but that is the last man‖ (1976, TSZ Prologue 5). The last man represents 
societies after the more overtly theocentric periods of history that now espouse theories that 
could replace theological explanations of existence. ―We have invented happiness,‖ say the 
last men, and they blink‖ (Ibid.). At this stage, philosophy is still hostile to life insofar as it is 
guided by the desire for the world to have a determining center that explains existence, a 
transcendental signifier, in the absence of the old faith in God. 
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The last, inevitable form of nihilism is passive. At this stage, large swaths of people 
denounce all willing – even a will to nothingness. Passive nihilism represents the full 
collapse of the will where the will itself wants to disappear rather than posit anything at all. It 
requires no further coaxing or conditioning through values of any sort; it simply awaits death 
in weary hatred of existence (Deleuze, 1983, p. 149). 
Previously, the will had at least experienced an initial moment of creativity with the 
formulation of both overtly theological and later more secular values. However, with passive 
nihilism the will is finally and fully exhausted: 
All is empty, all is the same, all has been! . . . All our wells have dried up, even the sea has withdrawn. All the 
soil would crack, but the depth refuses to devour! Alas, where is there still a sea in which one might drown . . . 
Verily, we have become too weary even to die (Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ II ―The Soothsayer‖). 
As Nietzsche here argues, it is not rage against life that results finally from an internalized 
nihilism as much as a miserable fatigue. Life becomes so overwhelmingly bleak and pointless, 
so wanting and empty, that existence defeats people entirely. 
1.14 THE HIGHEST SIGNIFICANCE OF HEIDEGGER’S DECISION CRITERION: 
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN NIHILISM AND DECISION-MAKING 
Insofar as nihilism means that life is devoid of positive value and meaning (i.e. 
worthless), it also serves the feeling that there is no meaningful goal or purpose. However, 
we know that eternal return already presupposes such things as meaninglessness and 
goal-less-ness through its anti-teleological and circular character. As Nietzsche writes 
regarding eternal return, ―Let us think this thought in its most frightful form: existence as it 
is, without meaning and goal, yet inevitably recurring; existence with no finale to sweep it 
into nothingness: eternal recurrence‖ (Nietzsche quoted in Heidegger, 1984, p. 174). By 
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making important decisions in full awareness of their lack of any possible goal or innate 
meaning that could derive from a teleological end, one is presupposing the nihilistic character 
of their actions (in eternal return) (Heidegger, 1984, p. 175). By confronting the conclusion 
that one is always and inexorably in close proximity to nihilism vis-à-vis the simultaneity of 
nihilism and decision-making itself, the important decisions that create who one is (and in a 
context of eternity, already were and will be) will also therefore create a meaning for what 
nihilism is (more on this in a moment). This implication might already sound as if it could 
easily apply to decision criterion concepts from the Anglo-American thinkers we looked at – 
in other words, regardless of any specifics it might seem to signal nothing more than a 
different attitudinal approach to one‘s actions. Immediately, we need to note a subtle but 
important point. In the absence of a cosmology, the Anglo-American versions of the decision 
criterion can only connect nihilism to decisions in a superficial sense. One can only ever 
imagine that their choices lack true freedom, and one can only imagine that their lives will 
return unchanged forever. With Heidegger‘s Nietzsche, to believe in eternal return means 
believing existence really is circular and innately meaningless and goal-less. Both Heidegger 
and the aforementioned thinkers have a decision criterion that can involve an attitudinal shift, 
but Heidegger‘s Nietzsche always invites an attitudinal shift based upon a cosmological 
implication. It carries far greater weight as a result, as it surely means more to actually 
believe something and act differently in response rather than just role-play. It is comparable 
to a person with a terminal disease determinedly living their last days with joy versus a 
healthy person who decides to merely live as if they were facing imminent death. 
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1.15 THE FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE OF HEIDEGGER’S DECISION CRITERION: 
OVERCOMING NIHILISM THROUGH DECISION-MAKING 
Paradoxically, eternal return both consummates and overcomes nihilism in the moment 
of decision. The life-affirming person is one who begins by recognizing nihilism in the nature 
of their actions: one recognizes that each act is intrinsically goalless and purposeless insofar 
as each act can literally do nothing to change the course of eternity. Because I can never 
remember the entirety of my life as I have lived it eternally, it merely seemed that I was 
actually choosing for the first time which university to attend, or which country to move to, 
etc. With awareness of the eternal return, I now know that in innumerable past lives I already 
decided such things, and that I can therefore never produce actions with novel consequences 
for my life or the world writ large. Only by this notion of nihilism being fully thought 
through and absorbed into the awareness of a moment‘s decision, is the decision at once 
therefore one that fully accepts nihilism on the most personal level. 
At the same time, Heidegger‘s Nietzsche envisions one for whom this awareness does 
nothing to psychologically cripple one and prevent one from acting as if they could create, as 
if their lives have not already been lived and created an infinite number of times. One 
recognizes nihilism as that which is true of being as a whole in the confrontation with the 
thought of eternal return, and yet by virtue of the fully cognizant mind that ceases to submit 
to the usual connotations with which nihilism flattens the will, one is already creating a new 
meaning for nihilism that will no longer be incommensurable with a will to create for oneself. 
This is how Heidegger can say that ―[T]he thought of return is to be thought only in 
conjunction with nihilism, as what is to be overcome, what is already overcome in the very 
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will to create‖ (Ibid., p. 175). One acknowledges that being as a whole is devoid of any 
possible goal or purpose but also creates as if the opposite were true all while constantly 
maintaining and affirming awareness of this truth. To affirm decision-making in full 
awareness of a reality that is literally nihilistic means to affirm and celebrate life in the face 
of such nihilism, and this goes against traditional philosophy inasmuch as philosophy has 
come to a conclusion of nihilism as the result of its rejection of life. One overcomes nihilism 
by affirming that it is an inextricable part of eternity. ―My formula for greatness in men is 
Amor Fati: that one should not wish things to be otherwise, not before and not after, in the 
whole of eternity‖ (Nietzsche, 1992, EH ―Why I Am So Clever‖ 10).5 
1.16 LIMITATIONS OF HEIDEGGER’S DECISION CRITERION 
Even with this important emphasis on the relation between individual decision-making in 
eternal return and nihilism in the tradition of philosophy in the west, Cooke rightly notes that 
in Heidegger‘s reading it is still mostly the attitudinal experience that is altered by the 
thought of eternal return. While one‘s reaction to being (including the smallest men that 
occupy the world) can be changed, being and the world itself (including the smallest men) 
can never change. Nothing can actually remove the smallest men from being nor thereby 
remove nihilism from the world – they are only psychologically overcome (2005, p. 23). 
Heidegger makes that clear enough. ―It is not merely that another series of happenstances 
unfolds; what is different is the kind of happening, acting, and creating. Color, the very look 
                                                     
5
 Amor fati, or “loving fate,” could also of course be applied to the notion of one’s personal life (and the world around 
them) returning exactly the same, but I find it carries the greatest profundity here in its connection to cosmological nihilism 
given what we have said about the normative limits of the decision criterion on the sole basis of every given act’s 
permanence. 
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of things, their eidos, presencing, Being – this is what changes. ‗Deep yellow‘ and 
‗incandescent red‘ begin to radiate‖ (Heidegger, 1984, pp. 131-32). One‘s immediate relation 
to being is transformed, but being as a whole is not. 
Heidegger‘s aforementioned emphasis on individual decision-making, through his 
glorification of the moment, means that most of the implications that Heidegger finds in 
eternal return itself are still rooted at the level of one‘s relation to existential phenomena.6 To 
be sure, this is not at all insignificant – we saw that the connection between decision-making 
and nihilism was rather profound. Even so, this is somewhat unfortunate for how it limits the 
transcendental potential of the doctrine, as what is most at stake is one‘s personal 
understanding of what being is rather than the structure of being itself. By extension, we are 
limiting the power of Nietzsche‘s thought to transform the nature of the world, or transform 
the way we structure the world in our theories. This becomes clearer as we examine the 
following. 
1.17 HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY: BEING AS PRESENCE 
Heidegger presupposes a limit to the radical character of eternal return when he situates 
Nietzsche in a Western philosophical tradition that he (Heidegger) harshly criticizes. We will 
not need to argue for or against Heidegger for the following. It will suffice to just briefly 
understand his reading of the history of philosophy to contextualize his critique of Nietzsche. 
It is well-known to anyone familiar with Heidegger that he considers the Being of beings to 
be the fundamental thought that must be determined by any philosophy. Heidegger argues 
                                                     
6
 I am aware that I am perilously close to uncharitable treatment of Heidegger, so let me add some acknowledgement of 
his reading here. To be sure, he did at least specify that an ontological determination resulted (higher versus lower types) 
from the individual’s reaction to eternal return.  
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this by first explaining that inquiry into what being is, inquiry into the nature of being, has 
proceeded in two ways. The first historical determination of being comes from Parmenides 
who claims that being simply is – it is permanence and presence. On the other hand, being 
can also be determined, as it is by Heraclitus, to be that which becomes – from this point of 
view it is therefore best understood as perpetual flux and self-unfolding change (Ibid., p. 
200). Heidegger, as we already saw, implicates philosophy from the time of Plato onward, 
and metaphysics in particular, for continually conceiving being as presence and thereby 
dividing the world into the Platonic distinction between a world of Being and a world of 
Becoming (Ibid., p. 174). 
1.18 CONNECTING HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE TO NIETZSCHE AND ETERNAL 
RETURN 
Finally critiquing Nietzsche, Heidegger argues that the problem with the eternal return is 
that Nietzsche is unwittingly using the concept to create his own theory of being even though 
he thinks it is a theory of pure becoming (Ibid., p. 35). According to Heidegger, Nietzsche‘s 
eternal return attempts to think of being as that which is really only becoming – the circular 
character of eternal return is meant to overcome metaphysics by moving away from any 
notions of a permanent world of being. Nietzsche tries to accomplish this, so says Heidegger, 
by conceiving of the eternal return as a theory that concerns itself solely with the transient 
world of becoming. There is only this finite world of becoming that returns forever as the 
eternal return, and so only becoming is real. 
Heidegger claims that unbeknownst to Nietzsche, the eternal return actually represents 
the culmination of the Platonic tradition. Heidegger argues that with the eternal return, 
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Nietzsche fuses both historical determinations of being into one. Insofar as eternal return has 
one determined state that perpetually returns and therefore permanently is, it still expresses 
being as permanence and presence. At the same time, the moment of decision expresses 
momentary, fleeting creativity within the greater context of permanent being. Whenever one 
creates something in a given moment that, by virtue of the forever-returning totality of 
existence, is therefore whatever it is in that moment for all eternity, one is stamping being 
with the momentary character of becoming. Insofar as a solitary act of mine seems to create 
some novel meaning for my life, it encapsulates the becoming of existence as that which is 
change and creation. At the same time, insofar as the totality of existence can never change in 
eternal return, even that act of becoming is actually just a part of being. For me, because I 
cannot remember having ever acted in a past cycle of time, a momentous decision feels like a 
novel instance of the changing world of becoming. In actuality, it is but another instance of 
the same being. My act has actually already been performed; what seems like becoming, what 
seems like change, is really just another example of static being insofar as my act (and all 
others) has been performed an infinite number of times and will be performed again 
infinitely. ―The ―momentary‖ character of creation is the essence of actual, actuating eternity, 
which achieves its greatest breadth and keenest edge as the moment of eternity in the return 
of the same‖ (Ibid., p. 203). Nietzsche, it is claimed, merely thinks he is producing a theory of 
pure becoming through the eternal return. He merely thinks he has eliminated the two-world 
doctrine that divides life into a world of Being and a world of Becoming. Heidegger believes 
that in actuality, Nietzsche has provided another answer to the question of being that 
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incorporates both determinations with which metaphysics has concerned itself. As a result, 
Heidegger claims Nietzsche actually maintains the Platonic divide between a world of Being 
and a world of Becoming. Being is split between moments of a creative will, which could be 
said to represent the world of Becoming, and the unchanging totality of events under eternal 
return that could be called the world of Being (Ibid., p. 199). 
It is on the basis of this characterization of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician that 
Heidegger de-radicalizes Nietzsche as a philosopher. ―[P]recisely because it seems to 
eliminate the Platonic position, Nietzsche‘s inversion represents the entrenchment of that 
position‖ (Ibid., p. 205). Heidegger turns eternal return into merely another theory of being, 
and consequently Nietzsche is read as no more than the last philosopher in that tradition, 
however radical he (and eternal return as a theory) is from within the strictures of that 
tradition. 
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Chapter 2: The Eternal Return of the Same as a Physical Doctrine 
 
2.1 THE BASIS OF HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE: INTRODUCTION TO HIS 
INTERPRETATION OF NIETZSCHE’S COSMOLOGY FOR ETERNAL RETURN 
To understand why Heidegger interprets eternal return as an ethical theory from the 
viewpoint of all events returning identically, we must turn to his interpretation of the 
cosmology. If Heidegger is right that eternal return is best read as the return of the same, it 
will ultimately mean that Nietzsche has not created a theory that is as successfully 
anti-theological as my argument contends it is. It will mean that Nietzsche‘s philosophy 
cannot remove the smallest men and the nihilism that they embody because it cannot 
transcend the philosophical tradition that spawns them. In the following cosmology section, 
we must address whether or not eternal return has a cosmology that entails a determination of 
being as the return of the same. 
Let us first preface any cosmological claims for eternal return with an understanding that 
in keeping with eternal return as a primarily anti-theological concept, Nietzsche is opposing 
his cosmology to ones that contain theological overtones. In the following, I will try to show 
that Heidegger is misguided in his attempt to explicate the cosmology as a basis for 
concluding that Nietzsche posits the eternal return of the same. Nonetheless, the value of 
Heidegger‘s reading of the cosmology is that it will help us to situate the cosmology within a 
broader framework - Nietzsche‘s ethical project of subverting the theological weltanschauung 
by asserting a new form of life where God can be overcome. It is this ethical project rather 
than any logically proven metaphysical arguments that I believe best explains the cosmology, 
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and finally eternal return itself. Nietzsche states, for instance, ―When will all these shades of 
God cease to darken our paths? When will we have a nature that is altogether undeified! 
When will we human beings be allowed to begin to naturalize ourselves by means of the 
pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?‖ (1974, GS §109). In a similar manner does 
he write in The Will to Power: ―It is still the old religious way of thinking and desiring, a kind 
of longing to believe that in some way the world is after all like the old beloved, infinite, 
boundlessly creative God – that in some way ―the old God still lives‖ …(1968, §1062). As I 
will try to show through the following exegesis, the cosmology that concludes with the theory 
of eternal return, rather than an attempt at a series of logically necessary truths or empirical 
claims, should be read as posits that present Nietzsche‘s most aggressively atheistic manner 
of framing the world – a framing that helps us imagine the world in a radically new way by 
expunging theistic notions. 
2.2 HEIDEGGER’S NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH – AGAINST THE TWO-WORLD 
DOCTRINE 
To establish a broader context for the cosmology, Heidegger refers to an interesting 
passage in The Will to Power wherein Nietzsche characterizes truth as ―a kind of error 
without which a certain species of life could not live‖ (Ibid., §493). That is, truth is not taken 
to refer to a representation in the mind that correctly corresponds to the world or some feature 
in it. Nietzsche is highly skeptical of such truth, but his argument is not mere skepticism. 
Rather, truth is taken to refer to a belief that enables or serves a certain form of life. As 
Heidegger puts it, ―[T]hus truth and what is true are not first determined subsequently in 
terms of a practical use merely accruing to life; rather, truth must already prevail in order that 
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what is alive can live and life as such can remain alive‖ (Heidegger, 1979, p. 55). This 
peculiar characterization frames truth as that which manifests historically – as a set of 
contingent beliefs arising out of ethical, rather than logical, necessity (Ibid., p. 57). 
Heidegger‘s Nietzsche insists that philosophy, inasmuch as it has failed to acknowledge 
its own historical contingency, has also failed to acknowledge the historical contingency of 
the premise that truth can accurately be called correct representation. In other words, truth 
was never really discovered as correct representation so much as just inferred as correct 
representation. This inference was the result of a preceding estimation of value (Ibid., p. 57). 
According to Heidegger‘s reading, Nietzsche holds that the essence of truth is an estimation 
of value that only then subsequently serves as the basis for an understanding of truth as 
correct representation. What, it must be asked then, was the valuation upon which this 
(historically contingent) sense of truth as correct representation arose? According to 
Heidegger, Nietzsche‘s interpretation of the two-world doctrine derives from his critical 
reading of Plato (Ibid.). Plato shapes the metaphysical and epistemological standard of 
Western philosophy as a whole when he makes a very clear distinction between the ontos on 
(true being or that which matches with the essence of being and can be called its ideal form) 
and the me on (the external appearance of the ontos on). The me on is a sensuous instantiation 
that can manifest only as an imperfect form. Every sensuous instantiation of, for instance, a 
triangle fails to match the perfection of the ―true being,‖ or ideal form of a triangle – a figure 
with three perfect lines whose lines add up to 180 degrees. The me on is an instantiation, that 
is, of what for Plato is the pure form known as the eidos (the idea). The table that one sits at 
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would accordingly be an imperfect instantiation of the pure form of the table (its essence in 
purely abstract form, or the ―tableness‖ of a table). All tables can be considered ―real‖ tables 
in that they are instantiations of this form, but they remain always and only imperfect 
expressions. With such a two-world account, truth is defined as that which correctly 
represents some feature of an ideal realm of pure form. As a result, debates over the essence 
of truth refer to whether a representation is correctly corresponding to the eidos. 
Heidegger explains that Nietzsche‘s account of truth goes against the preceding Platonic 
view by basing itself on a different valuation of life. That is to say, if truth is indeed correct 
representation, it is only so because it has historically been maintained as such for its ethical 
purpose. What this means is that the sense of truth is not necessary a priori but has been 
deemed necessary because a certain way of life historically founded on certain valuations has 
made it so. As Heidegger says, ―The essence of all beings is posited from the very beginning 
as value in general‖ (Ibid., p. 57). 
The valuation in question that produces the preceding account of truth is the distinction 
between a true and an apparent world – this is precisely why Nietzsche feels compelled to 
attack it (Ibid., p. 58). As we saw in the ethics section, Nietzsche holds that such an account 
(of truth) denigrates life and leads to nihilism (see pages 22-28 of this essay) – hence 
Nietzsche‘s disgust with such a valuation as a basis for understanding what truth is. 
Besides attacking the two-world doctrine for its denigration of life, Nietzsche further 
chastises truth as correct representation for what he perceives as a means of escaping personal 
responsibility. ―One positively wants to repudiate one‘s own authority and assign it to 
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circumstances‖ (Nietzsche, 1968, WTP §422). Nietzsche views the belief in eternal truths as 
a means of denying the role of human authorship involved in such truths. Mind you, this is 
not to suggest that Nietzsche is a voluntarist like Sartre. For Nietzsche, our beliefs are 
inevitably conditioned throughout history and not at all a straightforward matter of exercising 
personal freedom by choosing them or creating them ex nihilo (Nietzsche, 2003, BGE §16)
7
. 
For Nietzsche, regardless of the factors that might influence us, to believe that truth is 
something that accurately describes the world really means passively receiving (allegedly) 
discovered truths about existence and consequently forfeiting one‘s own powers of creativity 
and personal authority (however conditioned and limited they may be) to create our own 
concepts. 
2.3 HEIDEGGER’S NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH: BEING IS BECOMING 
Nietzsche takes a radically different turn with his own approach to truth. In place of any 
notion of accurate belief as discovering-what-is-true, Nietzsche defines belief as what 
Heidegger coins a ―taking-to-be-true‖ (believing in what is represented as if it were true even 
though you take universal truth to be an illusion) (Heidegger, 1984, p. 124). For Nietzsche, 
believing is not an activity through which we transcend the world of appearances by 
ascertaining eternal truths. Rather, because the truths that people believe are in fact 
prescriptions for a certain form of life, our beliefs create and maintain a certain order of 
existence rather than reflect it. We can therefore only ―take‖ something to be true, as truth is 
primarily an ethical and subsequently creative endeavour rather than primarily logical and 
                                                     
7
 See Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (1990) for Nietzsche’s most detailed account of how certain values have 
been conditioned since the historical rise of Judaism and Christianity. 
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descriptive. At this juncture though, does not Nietzsche risk self-referential incoherence by 
construing truth as an illusion that is merely taken to be true and yet simultaneously holding 
to the truth of the very claim (that there is no truth)? According to Heidegger, there is no 
danger of incoherence here, as he claims that Nietzsche is just consciously privileging a 
valuation that prioritizes the transient world we live in and precludes any other-worldly 
notions. Insofar as he has stated that truth is a vehicle for human beings to assert and preserve 
a certain way of life, Nietzsche‘s alternative account of truth implies historical contingency 
rather than correct representation. ―A belief, however necessary it may be for the preservation 
of a species, has nothing to do with truth‖ (Nietzsche, 1968, WTP §487). To argue that truth 
is whatever a particular species needs to survive implies that beliefs will be prone to change 
depending on the particular people and circumstances. We saw, for instance, that the 
prominence of Platonic philosophy has sprung from what Nietzsche considers a nihilistic 
form of life.  
To support his interpretation, Heidegger refers to a passage from The Will to Power 
where Nietzsche laments that by following the Platonic tradition and others that create a 
two-world doctrine, ―We have made the ‗real world‘ not a world of change and becoming, 
but one of being‖ (Ibid., §507). Against this Platonic, and indeed theological, subordination 
of becoming to being, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche attempts to construct the world as one 
in which being is really just becoming. In Heidegger's reading, it is this emphasis on 
becoming that is therefore central to Nietzsche‘s philosophical position. While a conception 
of truth as correct representation may have become historically reified, Heidegger‘s 
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Nietzsche would claim that an ethical commitment to the transient world of becoming 
presupposes moving away from the notion that concepts can ever represent a truth that is 
fixed and secure (as correct representation would have it). Heidegger interprets Nietzsche‘s 
characteristically dramatic statements like ―There is no truth‖ to be a direct challenge to 
traditional philosophy‘s tendency to create a valuation of being as a set of fixed and static 
entities (Heidegger, 1979, p. 66). Nietzsche thus does the reverse by conceiving of being as 
becoming and reconfiguring truth accordingly. Because Nietzsche asserts that the world is to 
be understood as becoming, ―Truth would then be incorrectness, error – an ―illusion‖ (Ibid., 
p. 64). Nietzsche‘s counter-valuation of becoming over being attacks the notion of truth as 
correct representation. Truth, it is so alleged, should not be viewed as that which is 
discovered and held to be true of an essentially unchanging true world set against one of 
appearances. Nietzsche instead commits himself to the sensuous world of becoming in the 
interest of eliminating any supersensuous world of being. In rejecting the valuation that 
produces an alternative world of being and defines truth as correct representation, what 
remains is the world of becoming and contingent beliefs. With the sensuous world of 
becoming, truth as correct representation is rendered an illusion and truth is only a 
taking-to-be-true. 
2.4 ETERNAL RETURN AS A PROJECTION 
Nietzsche‘s separation between the valuations underlying the order we impose on the 
world and the logical necessity or truth of that order sets the stage for Nietzsche to posit a 
new form of life – a decidedly atheist one: 
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The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment; in this respect our new 
language might sound strangest. The question is to what extent it is life preserving, species-preserving, 
perhaps even species-breeding (Nietzsche, 2003, BGE §4, emphasis added). 
Nietzsche‘s cosmology is constructed with this conscious purpose in mind of 
demonstrating what he takes to be ethically superior, species-breeding (because 
life-affirming) implications. In lieu of his rejection of truth (as correct representation), eternal 
return needn‘t be read in the narrowest sense as Nietzsche‘s attempt to accurately report how 
being as a whole is – it is not a matter of reading eternal return‘s cosmology as Nietzsche 
somehow trying to mirror how the universe is actually structured. His preceding account of 
truth would be exceedingly pointless if he were attempting any such thing. Rather, we may 
take his cosmology as offering one possible way the universe can be thought with its 
attendant ethical implications also showing us why it‘s a superior form of life to create. To 
that end, Heidegger's reading paves the way for a reading of eternal return as an ethical 
projection designed to achieve an atheist world structure. 
Against the notion that eternal return could be deduced from empirical data, Heidegger 
further asserts that we cannot arrive at being as a whole by means of a chain of particular 
facts or ―constellations of facts aligned in terms of cause-effect relations‖ (1984, p. 129). 
Instead, as Heidegger says, ―We come to being as a whole always and only by means of a 
leap that executes our very projection of it, assisting and accomplishing that projection in its 
process‖ (Ibid., p. 129). In keeping with his interpretation that Nietzsche rejects the notion of 
deducible static facts, Heidegger ascribes to Nietzsche the notion of this ―leap‖ as an initial 
statement Nietzsche deploys in order to aggressively assert an atheist picture of the world. 
According to Heidegger, this projection of how the world is, as the theory of eternal return in 
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Nietzsche's work, is in fact simply stated. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's claims about force, 
space, and time are subsequent ―posits‖ designed to cohere with and substantiate that initial 
projection, the mere assertion, itself. Heidegger writes: 
―Is the principle of eternal return disclosed by way of a deduction from prior propositions asserted of 
the nature of the world? Or does not the very essence of the world first become palpable as an eternal 
chaos of necessity by means of the determination of the world totality as one that recurs in the same?‖ 
(Ibid., p. 116). 
Such a move by Heidegger in the interpretation of eternal return's cosmology renders 
Nietzsche's initial characterization of the world as eternal return arbitrary precisely because 
Heidegger, echoing Nietzsche, claims that the world does not disclose any such universal 
truth of itself. Heidegger readily admits the arbitrariness that results. ―To posit the nature of 
the world in terms of the fundamental character of eternal return of the same is hence purely 
arbitrary if the world totality does not really disclose such a basic character—if such a 
character is merely attributed to it, foisted onto it‖ (Ibid., pp. 116-17). Here I must remind the 
reader of something crucial. While the initial projection of the world as one that is eternal 
return is, as Heidegger just said, arbitrary inasmuch as Nietzsche is merely ―foisting‖ such a 
character upon it at the start without logical necessity, it is not done randomly without 
sophisticated reasoning. To say it again, the matching assertions by Nietzsche amount to an 
attack on a theistic vision of the world and its values that privilege being and construct the 
two-world doctrine. The assertions amount to Nietzsche's ethical alternative. As a cosmology, 
it will rely merely on having a set of coherent assertions that match with the initial projection 
of the world as one of becoming - Nietzsche‘s proposed atheist alternative to theistic 
cosmologies. It is Heidegger who can be credited with inviting us to think through the 
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cosmology of eternal return in terms of pure possibility – a notion of possibility that is 
inextricably linked with its ethical conditions for an atheist worldview. It is likewise 
Heidegger who accomplishes this by situating a reading of eternal return within a larger 
framework that begins its assault on theology at the originary level of truth itself. 
First, Heidegger‘s groundwork will help us assess each specific concept, each subsequent 
positing of the initial projection of eternal return, within Nietzsche‘s cosmology to see how 
they reveal more and more of Nietzsche‘s perspective. This will next allow us to better 
understand Nietzsche‘s supposed reasons for making claims concerning the return of being. 
Now that we have an established context from Heidegger‘s interpretation of Nietzsche‘s 
conception of truth, engagement with Nietzsche‘s cosmology must take us to an account of 
the concept of force in Heidegger‘s Nietzsche. The concept of force is really at the center of 
the cosmology of eternal return, as it characterizes the nature of what, exactly, is alleged to 
return in any cycle – the being as a whole that is allegedly to return. Accordingly, the 
significance of Heidegger's interpretation of eternal return as a physical doctrine will depend 
greatly on satisfactory treatment of what force is according to Nietzsche. 
2.5 NIETZSCHE’S ANTI-THEOLOGICAL COSMOLOGY: FORCE AS THE 
DEFINITION OF BECOMING 
To understand what force is, and why it is so important for Nietzsche, we first need to 
take a step back and briefly appreciate what he is specifically opposing with the notion of 
force. For Nietzsche, a chief problem arises in the common deed/doer distinction. According 
to Nietzsche, very early on in one‘s life one is seduced by the notion that the human person 
constitutes a substantial entity with the power to produces effects as the efficient cause. 
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Nietzsche claims this happens primarily due to the frequent use of the grammatical pronoun 
―I,‖ which gives us the psychological sense of this notion of a self that is independent of the 
deeds it performs. Accordingly, Nietzsche claims that such a notion leads to us extrapolating 
from subjective experience and growing accustomed to thinking of the world in general as 
though it were comprised of ―things‖ controlled by the law of cause and effect (1968, WTP 
§503). Like Hume, Nietzsche is highly skeptical of our supposed knowledge of efficient 
causes. ―We have absolutely no experience of a cause‖ (Ibid., §551). Nietzsche points out the 
phenomenological example of how when we think, we do not actually exert control over 
whether or not the thought comes to us – the ―I‖ is not the cause of thinking. He thus states, 
―The ―apparent inner world‖ is governed by just the same forms and procedures as the 
―outer‖ world‖ (Ibid., §477). We do not sense, and we certainly do not literally see, efficient 
causes in either the ―outer‖ (phenomenal) world or ―inner‖ (psychical) ―world.‖ 
In what will foreshadow the arrival of the notion of force, Nietzsche proposes the 
following as an alternative: 
That one should take the doer back into the deed after having conceptually removed the doer and thus 
emptied the deed; that one should take doing something, the ―aim,‖ the ―intention,‖ the ―purpose,‖ 
back into the deed after having artificially removed all this and thus emptied the deed (Ibid., §477). 
The consequences are what inform the nature of what Nietzsche will call force. Such 
implications, which are far-reaching, include the following: 
Grasped that the ―subject‖ is not something that creates effects, but only a fiction, much follows. If 
we no longer believe in the effective subject, then belief also disappears in effective things, in 
reciprocation, cause and effect between those phenomena that we call things. There also disappears, 
of course, the world of effective atoms: the assumption of which always depended on the supposition 
that one needed subjects. At last, the ―thing-in-itself‖ also disappears, because this is fundamentally 
the conception of a ―subject-in-itself‖. But we have grasped that the subject is a fiction. The antithesis 
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―thing-in-itself‖ and ―appearance‖ is untenable; with that, however, the concept ―appearance‖ also 
disappears (Ibid., §552(b)). 
Nietzsche surmises that giving up the notions of ―subject‖ and object‖ as independent entities 
releases us from the notion of substance altogether, and any modification of it that may be 
posited – spirit, gods, atoms, and even the notion of matter altogether. ―We have got rid of 
materiality‖ (Ibid., §552(d)). 
What remains, finally, is Nietzsche‘s alternative concept of force. Force is Nietzsche‘s 
name for the alternative way of framing what exists in place of things-in-themselves, atoms, 
appearances, and any other derivation of the notion of a substance. He explains further: 
Duration, identity with itself, being are inherent neither in that which is called subject nor in that 
which is called object: they are complexes of events apparently durable in comparison with other 
complexes – e.g., through the difference in tempo of the event (rest – motion, firm – loose: opposites 
that do not exist in themselves and that actually express only variations in degree that from a certain 
perspective appear to be opposites) (Ibid., §552(c)). 
From the outset, force constitutes Nietzsche‘s picture of the world of so-called ―things.‖ 
Instead of viewing phenomena as stand-alone objects, or things-in-themselves (that can 
simultaneously stand in as examples of effects from causal subjects-in-themselves), 
Nietzsche views existents as parts of a greater process of flux and change – manifestations of 
force that do not imply the existence of any substantial entity underlying the actions they 
perform. To use Nietzsche‘s example, we do not need to posit a substance of ―lightning‖ to 
the activity of the flash of lightning itself (1990, GM I 13). This even applies to people and 
the qualities they are said to possess, such as in the case of a strong person. Nietzsche wholly 
opposes the notion that there is a substance (a person) in possession of an accidental quality 
(strength) that it may not otherwise use or have. Strength, rather, is that which one formerly 
called the effect. Strength is not a substance with the characteristic of being able to overcome 
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or perform action x or y. It is the effect, the act itself, of overcoming, of doing x or y. It is a 
doing rather than a mere being. Force means looking at what we called things so that we 
understand them as just these manifestations, just these processes of appearing and occurring, 
and nothing more. As he explicitly states, ―Processes as entities‖ (1968, WTP §655). 
By also asserting the nature of the relation between different quanta of force, Nietzsche 
further maintains the concept of force as one that precludes God. He assails the notion that 
the totality of force constitutes the universe as a unity. Nietzsche expressly asserts that force 
does not equate to any notion of a unitary world. ―It seems to me important that one gets rid 
of the universe, of unity‖ (Nietzsche quoted in Conway and Groff, 1998, p. 217). In keeping 
consistent with force as that which moves away from the notion of substances under the law 
of cause and effect, Nietzsche is careful to specify the impossibility of any notion of an 
unconditioned force that logically precedes the others insofar as it grounds or unifies a 
plurality of forces. In his words, ―One would not be able to refrain from taking it as the most 
serious court and baptizing it God‖ (Ibid.). 
Against the idea of causal unity, every force is instead stated as always being in a relation 
with another force. When we look at seeming ―things‖ or ―objects,‖ Nietzsche suggests that 
we think of each of them as particular assemblages of numerous forces - quantities of force in 
mutual ―relations of tension‖ (1968, WTP, §635). That is, every form of force (what we 
previously considered a ―thing‖ or ―object‖) actually includes numerous forces within itself - 
every force is always in a relation with another force from which it differs as either stronger 
or weaker. As these relations of force interact with each other, some either come to prevail 
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over others or come to be dominated by them. Whether a particular assemblage of forces (that 
makes up a form) is strong or weak depends on its quantitative sum of either predominantly 
stronger or weaker forces within itself. ―Might all quantities not be signs of quality?...The 
reduction of all qualities to quantities is nonsense‖ (Ibid., §564). The more precise 
implication of this relation will be clearer when we turn to the concept of will to power, but 
for now it suffices to show that for Nietzsche the world is ―unified‖ only insofar as it is a 
totality of ubiquitous force. 
To help us further understand more nuances of the anti-theological thread underlying 
Nietzsche‘s concept of force, Heidegger provides us with notes dating around 1883-84. By 
setting Nietzsche‘s assertions within a context that opposes the theological nature of the 
world, we can understand why Nietzsche makes certain further assertions. We can 
comprehend why he would insist, for instance, that force should be thought of as finite. ―We 
insist that the world as force dare not be thought of as being unbounded—we forbid ourselves 
the notion of an infinite force as incompatible with the very concept ‗force‘‖ (Nietzsche, 
1883-4, XII, number 94). Because force can be understood more narrowly as Nietzsche‘s 
primary theoretical component of a truly atheistic world-vision, we can understand his 
opposition to notions of infinite quantities because it would allow for one to posit a 
substance. That is, Nietzsche chastises any conception of force as infinite because it implies 
the possibility of an enduring substance (i.e. God) from which an unlimited flow of force may 
derive as its cause. In his words: ―Infinitely new becoming is a contradiction; it would 
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presuppose an infinitely growing force. But from what should it grow! Whence does it 
nourish itself, nourish with surplus!‖ (Nietzsche quoted in Conway and Groff, 1998, p. 217). 
Accordingly, Nietzsche goes further and adds that force undergoes neither augmentation 
nor diminution (XII, 1883-4, number 90). Nietzsche is talking about the quanta of force in the 
world – the finite totality of force that constitutes the world. Because Nietzsche is trying to 
create a theoretical framework that is atheistic, he must safeguard against arguments that 
would emphasize the possibility of anything with the power to supervene on what exists in 
the world. Accordingly, force must be described as neither increasing nor decreasing amidst 
the mundane occurrences of birth and death, creation and destruction, in the world. As 
Heidegger‘s point here clarifies, such a narrow description of force allows a characterization 
of the world (as force) that precludes collision with anything that the world is not (1984, p. 
88). Heidegger rightly interprets the claim of incompatibility between infinitude and force as 
Nietzsche positing that force is taken to be something determinate and ―firmly defined in 
itself‖ (Ibid., p. 87). 
To further clarify the positing above, force is determinate and defined in itself insofar as 
it experiences neither augmentation nor diminution and therefore does not depend on any 
concept outside itself to define itself and be real in this sense – it need not reference anything 
but itself. If such a notion of force does not experience augmentation or diminution by virtue 
of any creation or destruction, then the forms of force that appear do not presuppose the 
existence of a Supreme Being that qua a first cause could be said to have brought life into 
existence. In the same vein, a sum total of force that suffers no such diminution means that 
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the destruction of forms do not presuppose any Supreme Being that qua an infinite source has 
control and/or dominion over the world in which forms of force appear. Ergo, the echo of 
God grows fainter and fainter. 
Heidegger also explains Nietzsche‘s conception of the relation between the finitude of 
the world and the possible forms that force takes within it. For now, let us be clear on 
something. These ―possible forms‖ are all simply the specific beings that come into existence 
(the entities-as-processes that Nietzsche calls force). Heidegger specifies that these different 
forms are only virtually innumerable, or that they are merely uncountable in practice (Ibid., p. 
89). Nietzsche seems to say as much when he writes, ―The number of positions, alterations, 
combinations and concatenations of this force [is], to be sure, quite enormous and in practical 
terms ‘immeasurable’, but in any case it is still determinate and not infinite‖ (1883-4, XII, 
number 90). Nietzsche also rejects elsewhere the notion of an ―innumerable quantity of 
states‖ (Ibid., number 97). In other words, the totality of force ―has only a ‗number‘ of 
possible properties‖ (Ibid., number 92). Therefore, there is nothing in the impossibility of an 
innumerable quantity that controverts its actual uncountable nature in practice. At this point, 
Nietzsche is repeatedly and determinedly emphasizing the finitude of force as a concept that 
encapsulates the world as one that contravenes the ―infinite, boundlessly creative God‖ 
(Nietzsche, 1968, WTP §1062) of theological theories. 
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2.6 NIETZSCHE’S ANTI-THEOLOGICL COSMOLOGY: INFINITE TIME 
If force returns, what is the nature of the space and time in which it returns? Heidegger 
attempts to expound Nietzsche‘s conceptions of space and time8 together, a conceptual 
pairing that will come to be crucial for setting up the eternal return as Nietzsche‘s 
anti-theological theory par excellence. Contrary to what we will see when we turn to his 
concept of space, Nietzsche posits time as actual and real. ―But, of course, the time in which 
the universe exercises its force is infinite; that is, force is eternally the same and eternally 
active‖ (Ibid., number 90). This unbounded, actual time, as Heidegger rightly says, is what 
Nietzsche grasps as ―eternity‖ (1984, p. 90). The different forms that force take in the world 
come to be within an infinite stream of time. What then is the precise significance of infinite 
time here? The more precise significance of this will be clearer later, but if time is posited as 
infinite, this means first of all that a quantitatively unchanging sum of force literally has an 
unlimited duration of time to experience all logically possible transformations and changes. 
How though could infinite time, one may wonder, not involve a theological ground? 
Much more will be said about this in the first so-called proof of eternal return, but for now we 
can say that this concept of infinite time is important for Nietzsche for the sake of imagining 
how different forms could occur without an external substance or source to create them. In 
essence, Nietzsche has devised a way to imagine all the forms of force continually appearing 
in the world, to be ―eternally active,‖ without the notion of a Supreme Being entering into his 
constructed universe. As we will see in more detail later in our examination of the first of the 
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See Robin Small (2010) for a thorough investigation into Nietzsche’s thoughts on time throughout his body of work.  
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―proofs‖ for eternal return, the very notion of infinity allows force to be ―eternally active‖ 
and avoid getting appropriated by theological notions. 
2.7 NIETZSCHE’S ANTI-THEOLOGICAL COSMOLOGY: THE REJECTION OF 
SPACE 
Contrary to time, Nietzsche rejects space altogether. He posits space as a bounded 
―subjective form,‖ maintaining that the supposition of ―infinite space‖ is entirely false (XII, 
1883-4, number 97). Against the notion of real space, Nietzsche is asserting that space is but 
a subjective construct imposed on the world. He also further stresses, ―Space first emerged by 
virtue of the supposition of an empty space. There is no such thing. All is force‖ (Ibid., 
number 98). In Nietzsche‘s cosmology, space is rejected in both traditional senses as either 
empty or infinite. While this turn in the cosmology may appear random or perplexing at first 
glance (especially considering that time was posited as both real and infinite), it turns out to 
be a surprisingly cagey move on Nietzsche‘s part. Were Nietzsche to assert that force merely 
occurs in (any) space, this would leave open the logical possibility of metaphysical assertions 
of other substances or causal agents also existing at the same time. St. Augustine, for 
instance, concludes that God must have created space even as he wonders where God could 
have existed prior to creating it. Anselm, another famous Christian thinker, asserts that God 
can occupy every space (Cauchi, 2009, p. 25). Rather than imagine that there is a certain 
quanta of force alongside or surrounding a space that might also contain the one substance 
God, Nietzsche asserts that there is only ubiquitous force, the definition of which we have 
already seen is antithetical to the notion of substances like God. 
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Does not this discussion of force, time, and space-as-force now still seem insufficient for 
a conclusion of eternal return? Indeed, were we to stop here, there would seem to be a 
conceptual element missing for the eternal return to make full sense. Why, after all, would 
such forms specifically become in perpetuity? What would drive any forces to transform in 
any specific manner at all such that they become throughout eternity? To understand how all 
these forms of force continually appear in the world, and to understand the normative 
significance of them appearing within infinite time, Heidegger turns to Nietzsche‘s concept 
of will to power. Will to power, we will see, shall tie together these seemingly disparate 
(anti-theological versions of) concepts of space and time we have been examining into one 
totalizing theory of eternal return. With eternal return as our conclusion, we will then finally 
have the proposed final nail in God‘s coffin. 
2.8 NIETZSCHE’S ANTI-THEOLOGICAL COSMOLOGY: FORCE AS WILL TO 
POWER IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AND ANALYTIC READINGS 
We have thus far been discussing force, but to further describe the exact character of 
every form of force, Nietzsche employs the theory of will to power. ―The victorious concept 
'force', by means of which our physicists have created God and the world, still needs to be 
completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as 'will to power' 
(Nietzsche, 1968, WTP §619). Will to power, Heidegger acknowledges, is an important 
departure from past conceptions of the will (1984, p. 37). Heidegger is wise to recognize this, 
as Nietzsche makes it clear enough that he is not conceiving of the will as a faculty of the 
soul, or as that which effects consequences as a cause. ―The 'inner world' is full of phantoms 
and false lights: the will is one of them. The will no longer moves anything, consequently no 
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longer explains anything – it merely accompanies events, it can also be absent‖ (Nietzsche, 
1990, TI ―The Four Great Errors‖ 4). ―There is no such thing as a will‖ (Ibid., 1968, WTP 
§46). 
As for the specific details of what will to power might then mean, there is perhaps no 
concept in all of Nietzsche more prone to debate and a wide range of interpretations. While 
we cannot possibly cover the enormous scope of literature on that topic here, it should be 
noted that most analytic interpretations of Nietzsche derive a variation of the psychological 
reading provided by Walter Kaufmann.
9
 Kaufmann denies that will to power is a 
metaphysical theory and instead interprets it as ―essentially an empirical concept arrived at by 
induction‖ that explains individual behaviour in terms of the drive for self-aggrandizement. 
Kaufmann's interpretation claims that Nietzsche posits will to power as a monistic 
explanatory principle of human psychology in which all empirical instances are merely 
quantitatively different expressions of this one universal drive (1968, p. 204). As O'Brien 
notes, at one point Kaufmann's reading was ―almost completely dominant in America‖ 
(O‘Brien quoted in Clark, 1990, p. 5). Indeed, the influence of Kaufmann is apparent in 
several subsequent American readings. John Bernstein criticizes will to power precisely 
according to the Kaufmann interpretation, as he views will to power as Nietzsche's 
                                                     
9 
For further variations of the psychological reading, see Metzger (2009), Gillespie (2009), Rosen (2009), Ansell-Pearson 
(2009), and Soll (2012). For readings that deviate from this trend and may have been more influenced by the Heideggarian 
interpretation we are exploring, see Nehamas (1985), Richardson (1996), Danto (2005), and Haar (2006). In particular, Klein 
(1997) and Williams (1999) offer novel interpretations that are neither strictly psychological nor cosmological in any sense 
previously theorized, but that rather interpret will to power as a type of thought experiment or metaphor with normatively 
significant implications. 
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reductionist effort to re-define the quest for happiness as a psychological desire for the 
ultimate feeling of power (machtgefühl) (1987, p. 53). Maudmarie Clark offers a slightly 
more nuanced view, resisting the idea that Nietzsche intends will to power as the empirical 
hypothesis that all human behaviour is motivated by a desire for power. Nonetheless, she 
does not depart that radically from the psychologistic nature of Kaufmann‘s reading, as she 
still contends that will to power can illuminate large areas of human behaviour if we 
understand ―power‖ as ―the ability to do or get what one wants‖ (1990, p. 211). Satisfaction 
of will to power is, according to Clark, a sense of the effectiveness of one's actions in the 
world (Ibid., pp. 211-12). And in another move that at least still retains the focus on the 
willing subject, Rex Welshon interprets ―power‖ in Nietzsche as that which means striving to 
perfect one's activities and passions (2004, pp.180-81). These are all admittedly just sketches. 
The broader point is that Heidegger will break from any such psychologistic readings where 
the emphasis is on will to power as an explanatory psychological principle of the willing 
subject – where Nietzsche is read as a philosopher-psychologist attempting to do nothing 
more than ground the origins of subjective desire and explain certain human behavior. 
2.9 THE PROBLEM WITH THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AND ANALYTIC 
READINGS OF WILL TO POWER 
The chief problem with asserting will to power as a primarily psychological theory is that 
it presupposes some form of a unified subject who wills. In effect, such a presumed subject 
would depend on a more classical conception of the will that ―sees in the will the cause and 
source of our actions‖ (Haar, 1971, p. 9). We have already seen that Nietzsche repudiates 
such a view. The very nature of the various psychological readings fails to accord with 
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Nietzsche's claims that such so-called ―immediate certainties‖ like the will, the subject, and 
cause and effect are metaphysical superstitions (2003, BGE §16). In fact, Nietzsche is 
particularly critical of the notion of a unified subject for the distorting simplification it 
renders on every act of willing. For Nietzsche, every act involves the will both commanding 
and obeying. Insofar as in every act of will there is a command for some such willed act that 
is then obeyed insofar as the act is carried out, Nietzsche goes as far as claiming that the 
synthetic concept of the subject is merely used to disregard such complexities and associate 
the willing subject solely with the affect of command (Ibid., §19). It is to Heidegger's credit 
that he recognizes in this case that Nietzsche does not subscribe to the notion of a unified 
willing. Here he quotes Nietzsche from Beyond Good and Evil. ―Above all else, willing 
seems to me something complicated, something that is a unity only as a word; and precisely 
in this one word a popular prejudice lurks which has prevailed over the always meager 
caution of philosophers‖ (Nietzsche quoted in Heidegger, 1984, p. 39). 
2.10 HEIDEGGER’S ALTERNATE READING OF WILL TO POWER 
In Heidegger‘s interpretation of Nietzsche, the term ‗power‘ is a locution inseparable 
from the term ‗will.‘ ―[W]ill is nothing else than will to power, and power nothing else than 
the essence of will‖ (1984, p. 37). However, if power is the essence of will, what is the 
meaning of a phrase like will to power? Here we are advised by Heidegger to keep in mind, 
as we just noted above, that will to power is partly a response to Schopenhauer's idea of a 
pure, unified willing: 
―Does the expression ―will to power‖ then have no meaning? Indeed it has none, when we think of 
will in the sense of Nietzsche's conception. But Nietzsche employs this expression anyhow, in express 
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rejection of the usual understanding of will, and especially in order to emphasize his resistance to the 
Schopenhauerian notion‖ (Ibid., p. 41). 
According to Heidegger, Nietzsche regards all life as ―power,‖ as what is synonymous 
with every act of willing. Against the notion of a unified will, Nietzsche insists that there is 
merely the action of willing. Further, what is always willed is the power that is internal to 
every form of force – its intrinsic capabilities of enhancing itself to the utmost degree 
possible of what it can do or be. What is therefore emphasized is a notion of constant 
becoming. Whether it manifests as a life form growing beyond its physical state, or a person 
willing the creation of an idea, forces constantly seek to overcome their current states rather 
than just preserve them. As a will that has now been conceptually transformed into willing as 
the drive for power, the will to power is conceived as force striving without any alternative 
purpose to expand its capabilities as much as it can.  
Heidegger further remarks that this condition of striving is meant by Nietzsche to be 
inexhaustible rather than ever arriving at a final state. ―Willing is mastery over . . ., which 
reaches out beyond itself; will is intrinsically power. And power is willing that is constant in 
itself‖ (Ibid., p. 41, emphasis added). Every form of force is inexhaustible in its 
characterization as will to power. What is willed is power as an end in itself, but one that is a 
perpetually deferred end. Now obviously an object like a chair cannot try to become other 
than it is, so we need not think of such farcical examples. Nonetheless, even objects are 
comprised of what we typically called matter. This ―matter‖ then is really just an assemblage 
of forces, and for Nietzsche, this too has the character of will to power. Because all willing is 
the expression of power, which is inexhaustible in its pursuit to be other than it is, will to 
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power is simultaneously a structuring principle of transformation and change positing that 
force must always grow, expand, or become beyond itself. Will to power, in essence, is 
structured as the permanentizing of the process of becoming in things. 
In a passage from Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche also emphasizes the cosmological 
character of will to power: 
―[G]ranted that one could trace all organic functions back to this will to power and could also find in it the 
solution to the problem of procreation and nourishment – they are one problem – one would have acquired the 
right to define all efficient force unequivocally as: will to power‖ (2003, §36). 
Rather than limiting will to power to any one ―entity‖ (such as human persons), Heidegger is 
therefore right to interpret will to power as Nietzsche‘s basic characterization of all life: as 
the essence of all beings in the world (1984, p. 25). ―All effective force is nothing other than 
will to power‖ (Nietzsche, 2003, BGE §36). Will to power, as rightly interpreted by 
Heidegger, means that all living beings in the world constitute themselves by transforming 
themselves into something more (1984, p. 61). A category of ―all living beings‖ would 
certainly seem to exclude inanimate objects like rocks and pine cones. To say it again though, 
Heidegger has already noted that Nietzsche describes force proper as will to power, which 
would also then need to include all the forces that make up all the different 
entities-as-processes we see in the world. In particular, Heidegger focuses his attention on 
another passage in Nietzsche that also emphasizes this cosmological character of will to 
power: 
-what man wants, what every smallest part of a living organism wants, is an increase of power….Let 
us take the simplest case, that of primitive nourishment: the protoplasm stretches its pseudopodia in 
order to search for something that resists it – not from hunger but from will to power. It then attempts 
to overcome this thing, to appropriate it, to incorporate it. What we call ―nourishment‖ is merely a 
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derivative appearance, a practical application of that original will to become something stronger 
(1968, WTP §702). 
This particular passage also helps clarify an earlier point made about forces always being 
in relations of tension. Even the protoplasm is a plurality of forces contending for dominance 
and superiority. In the given example it is expressed as the protoplasm appropriating or 
incorporating what initially confronts it as alien. The resistance that the protoplasm 
encounters, an expression of a relation between the stronger and weaker forces, is inseparable 
from the expression of its will to grow beyond itself. If we use a different example, the same 
logic applies. Even imposing a new idea means confronting the resistance of a prior idea or 
mode of thinking to which it is opposed. Resistance is a presupposition of power, and this is 
why Nietzsche must originally posit that forces are in qualitatively differing relations rather 
than equal to each other. 
Lastly, this ubiquitous and inexhaustible cycle of continual becoming (creative and 
destructive), as what is meant by the term ―power,‖ is posited as the only goal of willing. 
―Power says nothing else than the actuality of will‖ (Heidegger, 1984, p. 63). The aim or goal 
of the will is something internal to it as a principle of form – power as a ―goal‖ of the will 
means aspiring for nothing that is external to the will such as wealth, physical dominance, or 
political tyranny. External goals as bases of power would presuppose a will that is parasitic 
on reified values and concepts rather than determinative – one which conforms rather than 
creates and maintains rather than overcomes. Will to power would negate itself by definition 
and be synonymous with the will to nothingness we saw earlier (see pages 25-27 of this 
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essay). ―Power as the essence of the will and not as its goal‖ (Heidegger, 1979, p. 52). Will to 
power, above all, is not a justificatory terroristic concept. 
By now we know that Nietzsche posits that the world is only one of becoming. Given 
what we have just discussed, it should also be clear how will to power can be interpreted by 
Heidegger as the key concept that epitomizes Nietzsche's cosmology of becoming. Because, 
in Heidegger‘s estimation, Nietzsche states that so-called being is becoming, this presupposes 
a constant tension within every form of force. Becoming can only ―be‖ insofar as it is 
growing beyond that which it is. In other words, a form of force with will to power always 
resists the character of a ―presencing, subsistence, permanence, withstanding disappearance 
and atrophy‖ (Ibid., p. 85). For Heidegger, will to power is unique in that structurally it does 
not reduce the process of becoming to a permanent state of being. Because will to power's 
moments of creating, striving or transformation always presuppose their own overcoming or 
opposition to themselves, will to power represents a favorable alternative to truth as correct 
representation. The static form of the eidos, the stillness of the supersensuous, is replaced by 
the continual movement of the sensuous world and eternal becoming of life. For Heidegger, 
will to power is the epitomizing concept that captures ―true truth‖ as a ―transfiguring 
semblance – a ―shining forth of new possibilities‖ (Ibid., pp. 126-7). 
2.11 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN WILL TO POWER AND ETERNAL RETURN 
IN HEIDEGGER’S READING 
Will to power, as a theory that describes the nature of force‘s becoming, is what 
Heidegger believes finally determines eternal return as ―[t]he way in which being as a whole 
is (1984, p. 109). It is also here, for reasons that will be clear much later on, that I believe 
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Heidegger is mistaken in his attempt to read will to power as the final posit that interprets 
eternal return as the eternal return of the same. Heidegger first says the following: 
Because the world totality is finite in the configurations of its becoming, although immeasurable in 
practical terms, the possibilities of transformation in its collective character are also finite, however much 
they appear to us to be infinite, because unsurveyable and hence ever novel‖ (Ibid., p. 110). 
We already examined the finite nature of force. However, it is because force has the 
character of will to power that every manifestation of it constantly changes by virtue of its 
nature as will to power to overcome itself. Because force is infinitely driving forward to 
become (something more or other-than) but has a finite number of possible configurations, 
Heidegger concludes that ―The advance and progress of cosmic occurrence into infinity is 
impossible. Thus the world‘s becoming must turn back on itself‖ (Ibid., p. 109). This ―turning 
back on itself‖ supposedly happens through force (i.e. with the character of will to power) 
being characterized as limited combinations occurring within infinite time. With the 
aforementioned character of will to power, not even the exhaustion of every possible number 
of combinations of force would lead to force stopping at a final state. According to 
Heidegger‘s reading, the only thing left would therefore be for a finally exhausted set of all 
possible combinations to eventually recombine. Hence, Heidegger is confident to read 
Nietzsche as claiming that these forms would necessarily reappear. In other words, all the 
forms of force have the character of will to power and therefore naturally strive to become 
something new. However, because a finite quantity of force can only produce so many 
different possible forms of itself, force cannot become different new forms forever. Instead, 
force eventually re-combines the same way and re-creates the same forms as before. For 
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Heidegger, will to power is the last key concept in Nietzsche‘s cosmology that makes the 
world paradoxically become forever only to become exactly the same. 
2.12 THE FIRST LOGICAL “PROOF” OF ETERNAL RETURN: A FURTHER 
ASSAULT ON THEOLOGY 
With all of this analysis complete, we are finally in a better position to assess Nietzsche‘s 
alleged proofs for eternal return to see if we should conclude along with Heidegger‘s reading 
that Nietzsche is asserting that a sum total of force returns as the same. Nietzsche allegedly 
constructs his first proof for the eternal return of the same in §1062 of The Will to Power: 
If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If there were for it some unintended state, this 
must also have been reached. If it were in any way capable of a pausing and becoming fixed, of 
―being,‖ then all becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all thinking, all ―spirit.‖ 
The fact of ―spirit‖ as a form of becoming proves that the world has no goal, no final state, and is 
incapable of being (1968). 
If one accepts Nietzsche's assertion that time is infinite, it is a simple matter. To wit, 
because there has already been infinite time for becoming to reach its goal, and it hasn't, as 
beings are still constantly changing and becoming (throughout the duration of this time cycle, 
though they return to the same state in every other time cycle that follows), then it cannot be 
on its way to achieving it. In infinite time the past, present, and future are temporally 
identical. Within infinite time, whatever is the case now is what also was and will be. Infinity 
presupposes a temporal simultaneity between points of past, present, and future. To describe 
one of them therefore describes them all. If becoming is still becoming in the present time, 
that quite simply means it is this same state of becoming in the past and in the future. 
To put it bluntly though, it is obviously only an assumption by Nietzsche that time is 
infinite. The mere fact that the world has not yet reached a goal tells us nothing significant in 
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and of itself. The world of becoming could very well be on its way to a final goal or state. 
What purpose does the proof serve then if it too is clearly only an assertion? 
With the aforementioned analysis of force (characterized as will to power) becoming in 
time, this so-called ―proof‖ is actually better understood as an assertion that coheres with the 
initial ethical projection of eternal return. It may be said to run contrary to typical theological 
thought, and the thought it opposes is one that would have us believe that the logical 
impossibility of an infinite regress leads to the conclusion that the world was created by a 
Supreme Being. As Williams and Palencik note, Nietzsche agrees with the theologians at 
least that the world has yet to reach a final state but opposes the subsequent conclusion that 
the world had a first cause. Williams and Palencik further add that they believe it allows 
Nietzsche to cast doubt on the mechanistic world view of thinkers like William Thomson 
(Lord Kelvin), who predicts that the world will reach a final state (2004, p. 407). As we have 
noted throughout our cosmological analysis, the ―proof‖ is a reminder of Nietzsche's 
resistance to theological notions. Let us now turn then to the second so-called ―proof.‖ 
2.13 THE SECOND LOGICAL “PROOF” OF ETERNAL RETURN: THE 
SCIENTIFIC RESPONSE 
The most explicit explanations of the cosmology of eternal return appear in The Will to 
Power in section §1066 from which I shall now quote: 
If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite number 
of centres of force—and every other representation remains indefinite and therefore useless—it 
follows that, in the great dice game of existence, it must pass through a calculable number of 
combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realised; 
more: it would be realised an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its 
next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and each of these 
combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular movement 
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of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has already 
repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum (1968). 
It is tempting to reduce this ―proof‖ to a scientific analysis. We need not make a 
scientific reconstruction of eternal return our main focus - we need only note that the 
scientific responses are anything but supportive. Capek, for instance, points out that quantum 
mechanics refutes a fundamental premise of eternal return: that the universe is composed of a 
finite number of differential elements. Capek references the development of the 
Bose-Einstein statistics to insist that quantum mechanics rejects both the idea that there are 
atomic elements that can be individually distinguished, or that any such elements would 
persist throughout time (Van Fraassen, 1962, p. 282). For this same reason, Robert Solomon 
harshly criticizes eternal return‘s cosmological basis, concluding that it relies on little more 
than outdated (classical) physics (2001, p. 124). Worse yet, a scientific reading of the eternal 
return would seem to be refuted by the basic laws of thermodynamics. That is, even if the 
same energy remains, it does not remain useful energy, and so the present elements in 
existence may not be able to re-form again after the demise of the present universe. 
2.14 THE PROBLEM WITH INTERPRETING ETERNAL RETURN AS A 
SCIENTIFIC THEORY 
Presenting eternal return of the same as a simple scientific theory bears the consequence 
of making it far too easy to dismiss the cosmology entirely. Without question, that has been 
the predominant pattern in Nietzsche scholarship, most of which assesses eternal return 
precisely as a mechanical theory. For the scientific objections that we mentioned, Alexander 
Nehamas claims that the cosmology of eternal return is so weak as to be rendered 
unnecessary (1980, pp. 332-33). For the same reasons, Maudmarie Clark asserts even more 
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strenuously that the theory does not hold any cosmological credibility at all and should 
instead be evaluated solely for the normative impact it poses to the individual (1990, pp. 247, 
269). She explicitly phrases it as ―the most common objection to eternal recurrence,‖ namely, 
―that we have no reason to accept its truth‖ (Ibid., p. 245). Likewise dismissive views are 
found in Gary Shapiro (1989, p. 84), Alan White (1990, p. 68), and the pairing of Stanley 
Stewart and Jean-Pierre Mileur (1993, p. 114). Once again citing the scientific position, Craig 
Dove perhaps best epitomizes the common refutation of eternal return‘s cosmology when he 
writes, ―It is inescapable that, as a theory of physics, the eternal recurrence entails the sort of 
mechanistic theory Nietzsche directly criticizes throughout the Nachlass and indirectly 
dismisses in his mature published writings…‖ (2008, p. 16).  
As a result of assessing eternal return as a scientific theory, many Nietzsche scholars too 
often dismiss Nietzsche‘s cosmological writings. The problem is that this fails to account for 
the analysis of Nietzsche's conception of truth that Heidegger presents us. Consequently, we 
lose the important context of Nietzsche‘s anti-theological stance at the level of truth that 
underlies the structure of eternal return's cosmology as a set of anti-theological assertions. 
Heidegger‘s interpretation avoids this particular pitfall. It is he who points out for us that 
Nietzschean concepts like force are metaphysical and not scientific, as they do not depend on 
empirical observation derived from experiments (Heidegger, 1984, p. 111). To claim that 
physics alone can determine the possibility of eternal return would be to overlook the (as we 
saw) anti-theological purpose of certain of Nietzsche‘s concepts in the cosmology. To only 
reference physics neglects, for instance, the special sense Heidegger‘s Nietzsche gives to 
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―space‖ as force rather than as something that could have a first cause of God attributed to it, 
or force as that which is precisely not atomic. Moreover, it neglects that part of Nietzsche‘s 
general critique of truth applies to science as well. Besides the obvious fact that the concept 
of force attacks such typical cornerstones of science as causality and materiality, Nietzsche 
expressly states that, ―‘pure knowledge, free of will,‘ is merely dressed up skepticism and 
paralysis of the will‖ (Nietzsche quoted in Nehamas, 1980, p. 335). For Nietzsche, a reliance 
on science for a definitive explanation of the world implies the same problem we examined 
earlier in truth as correct representation – the implied desire to escape from the responsibility 
of creating one‘s own concepts of the world. 
2.15 STRONG (LOGICAL) CRITIQUES OF HEIDEGGER’S READING OF THE 
SECOND LOGICAL “PROOF” OF ETERNAL RETURN 
This having all been said, the most common logical objection to the second ―proof‖ 
shows us why we‘ll only confront failure if we attempt to prove the eternal return of the same 
with logic. The critique goes as follows: even if we grant both that time is infinite and force is 
finite, a finite sum of force should not in principle preclude the generation of an infinite 
number of qualitatively different states. To my knowledge, Georg Simmel (1907) was the 
earliest to put this type of objection forth.
10
 Simmel disputes the logic of the premise that 
every possible finite determination of force, given the infinite time within which it occurs, 
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 See also Danto (1973, p. 318), Zuboff (1973, p. 351), Schact (1983, pp. 253-66), Wood (1989, p. 16), and Williams 
and Palencik (2004, pp. 397-8). Though they take their respective proceeding arguments in different directions, they all 
express this same doubt over the claim that finite elements will produce the same combinations given infinite time. 
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would eventually be exhausted and thus necessitate the eternal return of the same. Simmel 
gives the example of three wheels all of the same size situated on a common axle. Simmel 
specifies that in this scenario, we are to imagine each wheel is marked at a point on its 
circumference, with the points aligned along a thread stretched above the wheels themselves. 
Simmel argues that if the wheels were rotated at speeds of n, 2n and n/π they would be able to 
turn forever without ever returning to the initial condition of alignment under the thread. In 
other words, as Simmel writes, ―Finitude in the number of elements does not at all 
necessarily insure, even if there is an infinite amount of time for their movements, that the 
situation of any moment is repeated unchanged‖ (Simmel quoted in Soll, 1973, p. 324). As 
the example shows, the original configuration would never line up again if the speeds of 
rotation of the wheels were all different. Finite elements and infinite time are insufficient 
conditions of cyclical realignment. As an attack on the internal logic of eternal return, 
Simmel's objection is devastating. Although Heidegger offers no direct response (for 
whatever reason), Ivan Soll is one Nietzsche scholar who at least tries. He responds to the 
objection by claiming that Simmel simply assumes that recombinations of force are 
determined in advance by rules. Soll thinks Simmel is imposing a determining condition on 
all the elements (of their differing speed of movement, in this case), skewing in his favor the 
conclusion that they would never recombine (1973, p. 327). Soll is simply misguided. What 
Simmel's objection points out is merely that unless force is bizarrely thought of as 
consciously desiring to become the same totality of forms, a finite number of elements can 
easily exist in infinite time without falling back into the same configuration that makes up a 
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specific totality. The counter-example clearly shows as much, and nothing in Nietzsche‘s 
cosmology specifies anything against it. In Heidegger‘s interpretation, we saw that force 
(with the character of will to power) strives to become something new and recombines into 
the same forms because the forces that make up each form are becoming within infinite time. 
Nietzsche nowhere says that forces consciously strive to organize themselves into the same 
assemblages again, and that is exactly what he would have needed to write to preclude 
Simmel‘s counter-example. With Simmel's objection, there is ample logical space for the 
notion that these finite elements exist throughout infinite time cycles without reforming. 
There is another grave problem to confront in the second ―proof‖ that once again reminds 
us why trying to prove the return of the same with logic fails. T.K. Seung argues that eternal 
return just doesn‘t make sense as a concept that explains a sum total returning the same. 
Seung argues that there can be no return if all ―things‖ are eternally present (2010, p. 79). By 
―things,‖ Seung is referring to the different forms that a finite quantity of force takes. As we 
re-examine the cosmology of eternal return a bit closer, we can see how damning this second 
objection is. If one cannot point to any particular member in an identical series as that which 
is the initial member, it is simply incoherent to say that any particular member is an example 
of a returning one. If we cannot posit the original cycle by which a sum total of force first 
begins to become and exist, it is incoherent to ascribe a notion of returning to any of these 
cycles in which a sum of force exists as identical forms. Nietzsche's own conception of time 
as infinite therefore would seem to create the equivalent of a final state; one that is identical 
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to every other state. What Heidegger had described as becoming ―turning back on itself‖ 
(1984, p. 109) would seem much more like simple stasis. 
Stasis results from the absence of any difference between time cycles. Again, the notion 
of a return (of anything) presupposes a beginning. However, a beginning is precluded 
because infinity logically means that there is no such thing as a first member. The existence 
of the same totalities across infinity would mean the impossibility of differentiating them 
from each other in a series and thereby allowing one to claim that a particular totality of force 
is one that has returned. The notion of a quantity of force returning is rendered incoherent. 
With the notion of the same forms becoming in perpetuity of one quantitatively unchanging 
sum, there is no way to stipulate that any of the innumerable cycles of becoming is either 1.) 
the first cycle of becoming (the original totality of force becoming the forms that then make 
up our world) or 2.) a qualitatively different totality of force (a sum total of force that 
becomes different forms) that constitutes a distinct totality of what is therefore returning 
force. Nothing can logically return if it is impossible to speak either of a qualitatively 
identical sum beginning, or that sum becoming qualitatively different. 
2.16 THE ETERNAL RETURN OF THE SAME – SKETCHING AN ALTERNATIVE 
VIEW 
With these two objections, the eternal return of the same now appears weaker than ever 
from the point of view of both logic and science. What‘s more, earlier in this paper we saw 
that Heidegger‘s ethical implications of the return of the same (as an ethical doctrine) framed 
Nietzsche as somewhat of a failure in his attempt to overcome theology. Has Heidegger just 
read Nietzsche badly then, or is the eternal return a case of Nietzsche‘s philosophical 
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brilliance just faltering badly? In the following, I want to explain that if one wants to still 
accept Heidegger‘s readings of certain Nietzschean concepts like force and time for the sake 
of maintaining their normative force as anti-theological concepts, one can do so while 
simultaneously departing from Heidegger in reading eternal return as a totality of force that 
returns exactly the same. One can therefore preserve the powerful anti-theological 
connotations we have found it to contain. 
To first put it simply, there is no need for eternal return to be read as the return of the 
same. To that end, in keeping consistent with the claim throughout this essay (that the eternal 
return, both as an ethical and physical doctrine, is intended as an anti-theological vision), we 
must ask ourselves a fundamental question in opposition to Heidegger: Do Nietzsche‘s 
assertions in the cosmology really assert in the end that a perfectly identical state is what 
returns throughout time cycles? If I am right that they don’t, we can preserve all of the 
anti-theological importance contained in what Heidegger‘s Nietzsche asserted about the 
existence of a finite quanta of force, space-as-force, and infinite time while departing from 
Heidegger‘s problematic conclusion. None of this, interestingly enough, contradicts the 
ethical projection of eternal return or any of its anti-theological importance. In fact, as I will 
hope to show, Nietzsche is only emboldened as an anti-theological visionary as a result of 
such a reading. 
2.17 A BRIEF LOOK AT AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF ETERNAL RETURN’S 
RETURNING FORCES 
With that in mind, let us turn to the cosmological work of Rose Pfeffer, who can be 
credited for being one of the few to attempt to defend the cosmology while also challenging 
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the idea of eternal return as the return of the same
11
. Pfeffer points out that Nietzsche 
expressly rejects a formulation of force that would resemble the corpuscular life forms of 
classical atomism. ―The dynamic interpretation of the world with its denial of empty space 
and corpuscular atoms will shortly gain power over the physicists‖ (Nietzsche quoted in 
Pfeffer, 1965, p. 279). We therefore should not interpret Nietzsche‘s ―quantity of force‖ in 
the second ―proof‖ in such a way as to suppose that Nietzsche is positing that it will return as 
the same static being. In keeping with force‘s repudiation of matter, we can instead read force 
as more analogous to ―energy‖ - as a fluid and changing totality of becoming rather than a 
totality of parts that are intrinsically immutable and therefore unchanging from one time 
cycle to the next. 
When Nietzsche discusses re-combinations of force in the second ―proof,‖ we ought not 
to interpret that as him referring to an unchanging fixed state. It should instead be taken to 
mean a quantity of force that is constantly in a state of activity or movement (with, we saw, 
the character of will to power in the Heidegger reading meaning that it is constantly striving 
to become other than it is). In the absence of the claim that there are eternally returning 
combinations of self-identical, permanent material elements, we have Nietzsche‘s statement 
that, ―Everything has been here before innumerable times, insofar as the total field of 
[force]
12
 always returns. Whether aside from this anything identical has existed, is entirely 
indemonstrable‖ (Ibid., p. 281). This suggests conceiving of force more as a totality of energy 
                                                     
11
Deleuze, with his 1962 book Nietzsche et la Philosophie, is probably the most famous Nietzsche commentator to 
challenge the eternal return as a theory of the return of the same, but that work is so exhaustive as to require an entire 
paper devoted to its ideas. See Pecore (1986) and Cooke (2005) for an attempted repudiation and defense, respectively, of 
the rather unorthodox Deleuzian reading. 
12
 Pfeffer actually translates the German into the word “energy,” but I have substituted “force” for the sake of maintaining 
consistency. 
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that is constantly formed and released in various manifestations across time cycles. 
Admittedly, much could still be done to specify further about what this means about the 
nature of force and its character of will to power. For now though, this suffices as a 
counter-example that preserves most of the aspects of the cosmology of Heidegger‘s 
Nietzsche. Absolutely none of this contradicts, for instance, the earlier posits of 
space-as-force, force‘s characterization as will to power, or eternal time. It also seems more 
consistent with what Nietzsche is suggesting returns in the theory of eternal return given his 
overall explication of force that we looked at earlier. 
Following Heidegger, we have already specified, after all, that eternal return is an ethical 
projection at the onset with posits that are meant to cohere with it – it is all intended as an 
alternative that would preclude theism. This, I hope I have shown, has been the enduring 
strength of Heidegger‘s reading – namely, that it has shown us the ways in which theism has 
been precluded in every facet of the cosmology. For our purposes, we needed only point out 
that nowhere in Nietzsche‘s cosmological writings were we shown that we had to conclude 
that he presents eternal return as the return of one identical state. Pfeffer‘s textually supported 
reading of Nietzsche helps demonstrate this by paying greater attention to the more subtle 
nuances of force - nuances that slip past Heidegger - which oppose any notion of 
self-identical material elements that must result in the same exact forms that make up what 
we call the world. If we hold to eternal return as an ethical projection with accompanying 
anti-theological posits, accepting Pfeffer‘s reading of force returning as the same totality of 
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force (but not the eternally same forms) does not conflict with the previous posits made by 
Heidegger‘s Nietzsche.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13
 It is certainly not my intention, but it is interesting to note that this modified reading of eternal return might seem far 
more plausible or easier to accept given that the claims seem much less extravagant. To say nothing of space-as-force, for 
one who is already atheist but has no interest in advanced metaphysical theorizing, it might certainly seem prima facie to 
be the case that there is no innate goal to existence, that beings continually become, or that time is infinite. The biggest 
exception to this, of course, would be Nietzsche’s far more controversial and complex concept of force – it would doubtless 
not seem immediately true or obvious to anyone that there is no such thing as a doer behind every deed. 
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Chapter 3: The Eternal Return of the Same as an Ethical Doctrine 
 
3.1 NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF REJECTING THE RETURN OF THE SAME 
If the majority of the cosmology remains unaffected, certainly we cannot say the same 
about the ethical implications. In lieu of turning away from the notion of one identical state of 
being, it will now lastly be up to me to provide ethical implications that are more powerfully 
anti-theological than the ones we found in Heidegger‘s ethical reading of eternal return. You 
will recall that Heidegger‘s reading of Nietzsche contained its most powerful implications 
against the nihilism it perceived at the core of Western philosophy, but that it also suffered 
from two limitations in the form of being unable to remove the smallest men from the world 
and limiting the radicalness of Nietzsche as a philosopher. I believe my reading overcomes 
these problems and solidifies Nietzsche as the philosophical exemplar of godlessness. 
3.2 NIETZSCHE’S ETERNAL RETURN AND THE TWO-WORLD DOCTRINE 
First and most importantly, moving away from a (mis)reading of eternal return as the 
notion of one identical state solidifies Nietzsche more completely as an anti-theological 
thinker insofar as it protects his philosophy against the critique Heidegger levied at him 
earlier. If eternal return is no longer read as the claim that one static totality of force returns, 
Nietzsche‘s theory can no longer be charged with conceiving being as permanence and 
presence, contrary to what we saw Heidegger argue (see pages 33-35 of this essay). 
Nietzsche‘s eternal return can no longer be said to divide existence into a world of Being on 
the one hand (as one identical totality of events that returns infinitely) and a world of 
Becoming on the other (in the form of passing moments that seem to provide opportunities 
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for creative decision-making). Heidegger‘s reading can thus no longer charge that on this 
basis Nietzsche‘s philosophy unwittingly maintains a form of the theological two-world 
doctrine we have mentioned (between a world of Being and a world of Becoming), and that it 
therefore fails to more radically oppose theology as a whole. If Nietzsche has been more 
accurately read as positing that force returns, but not necessarily as the exact same forms, 
Nietzsche has succeeded in establishing a world where there is only this world of becoming 
with force epitomizing becoming to the maximal extent insofar as its characterization as will 
to power means a world of continual transformation and change without any notion of 
self-identical substances. 
3.3 ETERNAL RETURN AND THE CONTINUED STRUGGLE AGAINST 
NIHILISM 
One could object that moving away from the idea of the return of the same deprives the 
theory of its connotations concerning nihilism. For instance, we saw that when Heidegger 
wrote, ―[T]he thought of return is to be thought only in conjunction with nihilism, as what is 
to be overcome, what is already overcome in the very will to create‖ (1984, p. 175), 
Heidegger‘s Nietzsche was using the eternal return as a decision criterion that fought against 
nihilism by simultaneously acknowledging and affirming that nihilism was embodied in 
one‘s actions insofar as one returning totality meant one‘s actions were doomed to be 
intrinsically goalless and purposeless because they had already been performed an infinite 
number of times and therefore could never be novel or capable of changing anything. If we 
now understand that the same totality of events does not return, that everything I have 
experienced and will ever know of myself and the world does not literally return unchanged, 
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what becomes of what Heidegger‘s Nietzsche has said about the horrors of a returning world? 
Can affirming eternal return still overcome nihilism and dread? 
While one‘s agency will no longer be impacted by the doctrine as it was before14 (see 
pages 5-6 of this essay), nihilism is still embodied in one‘s actions under this reading of 
eternal return, albeit differently than before. To briefly return to a quote made by Nietzsche, 
―Let us think this thought in its most frightful form: existence as it is, without meaning and 
goal, yet inevitably recurring; existence with no finale to sweep it into nothingness: eternal 
recurrence‖ (Nietzsche quoted in Heidegger, 1984, p. 174). Existence can still be thought of 
as lacking any goal or meaning even if the same events do not return unchanged. With the 
Nietzschean cosmology in Heidegger‘s reading still precluding any God (even with the 
change we made with the help of Pfeffer‘s work), we are still left with existence without a 
meaning or goal. To wit, we can interpret Nietzsche here as positing that existence lacks any 
innate goal or purpose because it is no more and no less than a totality of forms continually 
coming into existence, continually becoming, and continually dying. In this sense, the innate 
meaning of the world is still nihilistic in that it still lacks an intrinsic goal or teleology. It 
contains no meaning beyond what one gives it, or beyond what one creates for oneself in 
certain opportune moments. If we embrace a vision of life in Nietzsche‘s philosophy as 
nothing more than a continually returning totality of force that inexhaustibly manifests as 
different forms across infinite time, existence is still no more than this circular (because 
                                                     
14
 This is not to suggest that agency is completely unaffected under this modified reading. Although perhaps nothing 
would compare to knowing every possible choice has already logically been made, there are still implications to be found in 
our new reading. For sure, the removal of the subject-in-itself in Nietzsche’s explanation of force (as that which returns) 
still necessitates skepticism about agency, and in turn this skepticism could constitute a certain horror all its own to be 
(psychologically) overcome. 
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infinitely unchanging) process. Without any God to give existence a divine plan, without any 
supersensuous realm in which things like everlasting truth, retribution or paradise could 
inhere, existence is still innately meaningless and goalless. That is, it is meaningless and 
goalless prior to any contingent creation of a goal or meaning by us – it is still every bit as 
innately nihilistic in these two specific senses as it was previously deemed by Heidegger‘s 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche‘s notion of amor fati still then applies. By creating a certain type of life 
for oneself in the world and stamping moments with one‘s own created meaning in full 
affirmation of the cosmological ineradicability of nihilism
15
 (see pages 21-31 of this essay 
for a reminder of the full details of what that entails), one is still thereby overcoming nihilism 
even if the exact forms or details of their life and world are not returning. 
3.4 THE DEATH OF THE SMALLEST MEN 
Further, a clear advantage of our reading of the cosmology is that it no longer makes it 
impossible for Zarathustra‘s smallest men, life‘s petty deniers of life, to be removed from 
existence. The predicament we encountered in Heidegger‘s Nietzsche was that being as a 
whole would always remain unchanged, and it was thus mostly one‘s relation to existential 
phenomena that was altered by the thought of eternal return. If the exact same collection of 
small men like Hitler and Charles Manson do not share existence with us ad infinitum, 
affirming life in the world we live in no longer means that we have to affirm that they will be 
alive again in every cycle of time. We can do nothing in the present to change the fact that 
they ever existed in the first place (and so we must, as Heidegger similarly mentioned in the 
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 This is not to confuse cosmological nihilism (and its ineradicability) with historico-cultural nihilism. 
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ethics section, still affirm the past in affirming the present as we move toward the future), but 
we can in principle overcome them beyond the psychological sense of Heidegger‘s reading. 
However, might one now object that such a move evacuates eternal return of its dread? 
The charge could be that if we abstract from the notion that we must affirm the return of 
every historical life denier, or tragic and abominable event in order to affirm life, we 
conveniently spare ourselves the true horror of the eternal return – the same horror that is 
meant to be psychologically overcome (by the few who can do it) and serve as one of the 
primary purposes of eternal return as a vehicle for affirming life. 
3.5 THE REMAINING HORRORS OF ETERNAL RETURN – LIFE, DEATH, AND 
HISTORY AS A WHOLE 
First, it might be said that the lack of return of the exact same beings actually makes 
eternal return more profound for anyone who loves being alive. Insofar as a totality of force 
inexhaustibly returns, Nietzsche permanentizes only the process of becoming and therefore 
presupposes absolute death for all singular beings. Previously, through the eternal return of 
the same I could find comfort in the notion that I would always exist. Although there was 
undoubtedly horror within the realization that the content of existence could never be altered, 
at least I knew I would exist again in my singularity. Although everything from my agency to 
my understanding of the events of history was impacted, I could in theory still have found 
solace in believing that the conscious, embodied person I self-identified as would return and 
be alive again. It would be the same life, yes, but at least it would be a life. 
With the lack of return of the same beings, one must now overcome the permanence of 
one‘s own death. Previously, one of the greatest weights concerning one‘s death was that 
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one‘s own life and death were not novel events and were thereby seemingly deprived of 
significance. However, we saw that Heidegger‘s point was to emphasize that one was still 
capable of stamping their own contingent meaning on existence even as they were powerless 
to actually change how life and death would always occur. With our new understanding of 
eternal return, the death of the individual is absolutized in that notions of either an 
other-world or exact corporeal return are removed as qualifiers of this death. The only 
―solace‖ that remains is in further affirming life on the basis of affirming that my life 
represents the simultaneous finitude of my life and infinitude of becoming writ large. 
Affirming my absolute death can simultaneously affirm life precisely because in doing so I 
affirm that the totality of becoming exists an eternity beyond me. That I so love you, O 
eternity, I can someday joyously give myself to die in you – this, the eternal return now 
demands. 
Furthermore, an eye that is keen and brave enough will see much horror to be overcome 
in this version of eternal return. While specific deniers of life and specific historical atrocities 
do not return, under our altered construal of eternal return, one must still affirm the worst 
aspects of life in general and their sad parade of awful tidings. Affirming life now still means 
affirming that the many faces of death, destruction, and nihilism perpetually show themselves 
without any innate justification or teleological retributivism. If eternal return is the 
inexhaustible return of a totality of force, even the lack of the same exact beings does not in 
itself preclude certain general forces from returning - one need only look at our own 
blood-soaked history for ample proof of that. 
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This version of eternal return signals no less of a tragic age, for affirming the eternal 
return still means affirming that one must live and struggle with certain events or problems 
like nihilism, war and religion that always seem to recur for historical Man
16
 – the ideas, 
practices, or in short the totality of our cultural heritage, that continues to shape who we 
become. A crucial element of Nietzsche‘s thought includes (not unlike Marxism) 
acknowledging that even the strongest opponents of historical phenomena are nonetheless 
their byproducts. When speaking of the traditional will to truth, for instance, Nietzsche 
remarks in On the Genealogy of Morals that even the most radical atheism (of his kind) ―is 
therefore not the antithesis of that ideal, as it appears to be; it is rather only one of the latest 
phases of its evolution, one of its terminal forms and inner consequences‖ (1990, III 27). 
3.6 ETERNAL RETURN AND THE PERPETUAL CREATION AND DESTRUCTION 
OF IDEAS 
Another burden that remains is the onus to create ideas that do not become reified. To 
return to the previous quote, Nietzsche there concludes that we are in the midst of ―the 
awe-inspiring catastrophe of two thousand years of training in truthfulness that finally 
forbids itself the lie involved in the belief in God‖ (Ibid.) – this is the inner consequence to 
which he‘s referring. ―God‖ also signifies transcendental signifiers of truth rather than any 
specific deity, and we have seen that Nietzsche‘s atheism opposes a metaphysics that 
constructs the ―true‖ world as fixed and static by means of conceiving of a supersensuous 
realm. Ever-changing ideas are also therefore central to the eternal return as the embodiment 
of pure becoming. We have already noted that the will to power is, in Heidegger‘s Nietzsche, 
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 My retaining of the sexist term is fully intentional – sexism is obviously part of our cultural heritage. 
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the basic character of all beings, and that it can manifest in persons as an active power that 
seeks to create from out of its own sense of fullness. As it relates to people in the eternal 
return it therefore means willing the creation of new values, of new ideas – and if these ideas 
are to be consistent with eternal return as an atheist philosophy of pure becoming, they must 
always inevitably perish. ―Whatever I create and however much I love it – soon I must 
oppose it and my love; thus my will wills it‖ (Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ II ―On 
Self-Overcoming‖). Against traditional, theological philosophy‘s presupposition that ―What 
is, does not become; what becomes, is not…‖ (Nietzsche, 1990, TI ―‘Reason‘ in Philosophy‖ 
1)‖ the eternal return is contrary to the suppression of creativity in the formula that whatever 
changes, transforms, becomes something new or passes away is an objection. Nietzsche‘s 
hallowed dream is the inversion of that mentality. ―And life itself confided this secret to me: 
Behold, it said, I am that which must always overcome itself‖ (Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ II ―On 
Self-Overcoming‖). 
However, another important burden arises with the onus to create, for the creation of 
ideas also presupposes evaluation and destruction. Creating new ideas means evaluating the 
ideas that have already become reified and accepted as universal necessities – that have 
become staples of being that thus stand in opposition to the world of becoming in eternal 
return. Nonetheless, Nietzsche will always insist that destroying old ideas is insufficient, for 
it does nothing to demonstrate a will that has affirmed becoming; that has affirmed both 
creativity and destruction in the eternal return as the pure becoming of life itself. Nietzsche‘s 
aggressiveness in asserting the necessity of destroying past ideas only by creating new ones is 
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an important element in his opposition to a theological structuring of the world in particular. 
When he seems to be shouting that, ―We can destroy only as creators!‖ (Nietzsche, 1974, GS 
§58), one simply cannot abstract these claims from Nietzsche‘s belief that theological ideas 
have dominated philosophy. The will to create stands opposed to historical ideas that 
resemble being insofar as they proclaim themselves universally, eternally true and aim to 
remain fixed - such as the Judeo-Christian imperative to ―Love the LORD your God and keep 
his requirements, his decrees, his laws and his commands always‖ (Deuteronomy 11:1, The 
New King James Version). That is why in referring to the will to create, Nietzsche states 
unequivocally, ―This will lured me away from God and gods; for what would there be to 
create if gods – existed!‖ (1992, EH ―Why I Write Such Good Books‖ 8). The eternal return 
further overcomes theology by creating ideas that presuppose their own future destruction in 
the name of the same creative will that spawns ideas in the first place. 
3.7 THE ETHICALITY OF STRONG AND WEAK TYPES 
Might this thought of destroying past ideas make one rather uneasy? In particular, the 
eternal return‘s emphasis on contingency and subjective creativity obviously presupposes the 
denial of objective representations of morality, which could also seem to imply a grave threat 
to the very preservation of a species. We have already talked of will to power not seeking out 
external sources of power as its goal (see pages 60-61 of this essay). Even so, destroying the 
transcendental necessity of morality might seem to permit too much in the individual who 
creates freely for oneself – adultery, deception, violence and perhaps countless other acts of a 
vicious and ultimately destructive kind. Does a Nietzschean world imply the most extreme 
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vulnerability of persons to the rationalized cruelty and brutality of the cruelest and most 
brutal among us? 
While Nietzsche is notorious for loving the noble classes of ancient societies, a closer 
examination of what he actually regards and celebrates as noble ought to do much to alleviate 
concerns of a possible future world of moral chaos. Nietzsche‘s enthusiasm for nobility is not 
some insipid class-worship, and neither is it a callous celebration of their acts of cruelty upon 
members of oppressed classes.
17
 What Nietzsche praises in the noble man is what he 
perceives as a joyous self-affirmation that bestows upon itself the right to create values. ―The 
noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values, he does not need to be 
approved of, he judges ‗what harms me is harmful in itself‘, he knows himself to be that 
which in general first accords honour to things, he creates values‖ (Nietzsche, 2003, BGE 
§260). This noble type of value-making that Nietzsche calls master morality is always in 
contradistinction to the slave type of morality that conforms to established values while 
denying its will to power as creator. ―In no way accustomed to positing values himself, he 
also accorded himself no other value than that which his master accorded him‖ (Ibid., §261). 
Contrary to the slave, the noble designates a type who affirms its own values‘ origins of 
subjective authorship as a sufficient basis of authority, and we have seen that only such a type 
is capable of affirming the creativity and destruction inherent in the eternal return. By 
contrast, the only creativity Nietzsche sees in the weak classes is in their original denial and 
                                                     
17
 Nietzsche is not in any sort of denial or ignorance about the fact that ruling nobles were often monstrous, merciless 
killers. “We can imagine them returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape, and torture, jubilant and at peace with 
themselves as though they had committed a fraternity prank – convinced, moreover, that the poets for a long time to 
come will have something to sing about and to praise” (Nietzsche, 1990, GM I 11). 
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negation of their other when the ancient slave classes, following the condemnatory moral 
language of Judaism, first began to ontologize their masters by defining them as evil beings. 
―But you noble and mighty ones of the earth will be, to all eternity, the evil, the cruel, the 
avaricious, the godless, and thus the cursed and damned!‖ (Nietzsche, 1990, GM I 7). 
Contrary to the values of the nobles, values that grow out of self-affirmation, even the 
creativity of Judaic values were limited to the extent that such morality just expressed a ―[n]o 
to an ―outside,‖ an ―other,‖ a non-self.‖ Nietzsche continues, ―that no is its creative act‖ 
(Ibid., I 10). Such hateful negation of the other, which Nietzsche terms ressentiment, does not 
therefore affirm creativity as such and cannot therefore affirm the eternal return. Already we 
can see that Nietzsche‘s emphasis on nobility is not about glorifying classism, oppression or 
acts of any vicious sort. 
This characterization of the noble type as an individualistic author of his own ideas might 
still seem though to suggest that relations with others could be frightening, as if a noble type 
would feel free to appropriate or subjugate the other in every such relation per his whims. 
The ever astute Nietzsche carefully specifies otherwise when discussing a noble type‘s 
relation to members of lower classes (instead of just the slaves, we can also imagine relations 
between noble types and Heidegger‘s lower ontological category of the ―fleeting‖ type 
constituted by the thought of eternal return). Nietzsche concedes that in all such unequal 
relations, ―It is here that pity and the like can have a place‖ (2003, BGE §260). Rather than 
reject any notion of ethical relations tout court, Nietzsche merely opposes the ubiquitous 
normalization of and widespread conformity to slavish moral values. Such opposition comes 
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as no surprise. We have already detailed that Heidegger‘s Nietzsche diagnoses nihilism as the 
founding value of Western thought, and also that he opposes any such concepts that seem to 
be further (though more elusive) expressions of that value. Nietzsche argues that nihilism 
undergirds slave morality not just in its attempt to stipulate universality and transcendental 
necessity to moral values, but also to the extent that the perceived necessity of values such as 
pity and humility – values that define a good man as one who is also harmless - are at bottom 
qualities deemed practical by the weak types for enduring the horrible suffering of existence 
(Ibid.). Conformity to such values means internalizing the attitude of the weak, contemptuous 
slave who cannot affirm any will to create. Nietzsche similarly argues this point in On the 
Genealogy of Morals. He claims that the dominated slaves of ancient times were not capable 
of direct action against their powerful masters who considered that to be aristocratic meant to 
be good, strong, happy, and beautiful, and who subsequently regarded the plebeian classes as 
pitiable, weak, miserable, and ugly. The Judaic priests inverted this value system through their 
concept of good and evil, so that it now signified that to be weak, suffering, ugly, poor, etc. 
suddenly meant also to be good while all that was noble was associated with evil – this 
provided a spiritual form of revenge that remained entirely abstract but no less reflected the 
hatred of the otherwise helpless slave classes against their oppressors and the world that had 
frustrated them. All in all, slave values began by valorizing qualities that originally reflected 
hatred of an other and of existence (Nietzsche, 1990, GM I 10). One might say then that 
Nietzsche is merely exposing that which seems ethical but is really just nihilistic for its 
attempt to stultify becoming, and for its veiled expression of its hatred in and of life. 
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In another important passage, Nietzsche describes further qualities of a strong or noble 
type that would seem to further countervail any notion of unrestrained or normalized cruelty 
and brutality in the world of eternal return: 
To be incapable of taking one‘s enemies, one‘s accidents, even one‘s misdeeds seriously for very long – 
that is the sign of strong full natures in who there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate 
and to forget (a good example of this in modern times is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile 
actions done him and was unable to forgive simply because he – forgot). Such a man shakes off with a 
single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others; here alone genuine ‗love of one‘s enemies‘ is possible – 
supposing it to be possible at all on earth. How much reverence has a noble man for his enemies! – and such 
reverence is a bridge to love (Ibid., I 10). 
Here Nietzsche opines that a surplus of strength correlates to a capability for forgetting. It is 
not a forgetting done from a stupid or incapable mind. A strong person, in Nietzsche‘s 
estimation, is one whose own abundance of power (to create), whose abundance of joy is 
synonymous with their ability to quickly overcome perceived transgressions against them. It 
is another feature that separates the strong from the weak, as the weak are further 
characterized by a ―suppressed hatred, impotent vindictiveness‖ (Ibid.) that results from their 
ressentiment. Nietzsche is arguing that for one who has affirmed their will to power as a 
creator, a joyous and affirmative love of life and self completely appropriates all of the 
psychological energy that might otherwise be directed toward a prolonged hatred and 
internalized vindictiveness against others. How many of the world‘s most heinous actions are 
predicated on a festering loathing, a virulent hatred that rises from one‘s darkest thoughts to 
take action? How many cases of methodical torture sessions, sophisticated murder plots, or 
patiently engineered hate crimes seem to imply not just the determining power of reified 
ideas, but also of an inability to forget? 
 88 
 
3.8 ETERNAL RETURN AND THE ETHICAL RELATION TO THE OTHER 
 One might still feel the need to object that even if we accept the preceding accounts of 
master and slave morality, the eternal return is bereft of any implicit substantive ethical 
relation to the other. The eternal return, it could be argued, is too atomistic in its reductive 
emphasis on the individual‘s experience of decision-making and creativity. This too, I think, 
would be unwarranted. It is obvious by now that affirming the eternal return entails a deeply 
personal experience. Even so, in affirming the eternal return as the tragic age, it is still 
therefore our shared tragic age. It is our shared history, for all its nihilism, bloodshed, sad 
mistakes and atrocious blunders that is ours together to bear, and the ground upon which we 
must stand to affirm life in all its terrifying and beautiful features. It is likewise the 
cosmological ineradicability of nihilism in a circular and goal-less existence that is 
necessarily shared by all people in the eternal return even if Nietzsche believes only a select 
few will be capable of joyously affirming its consequences. All of this already implies a 
logical space for compassion toward the other – a basis for receiving the other rather than 
disregarding the other as wholly alien or wholly separate from ourselves. 
 Rather surprisingly, Nietzsche‘s further analysis of Christianity as an historical 
phenomenon further implies the possibility of an ethical relation to the other. Nietzsche 
believes that the creative, imposing instincts of the affirmative nobles we looked at were 
eventually stifled and completely gave way to the slave type of morality as Judeo-Christian 
thought began to dominate. ―They were forced to think, deduce, calculate, weigh cause and 
effect – unhappy people, reduced to their weakest, most fallible organ, their consciousness!‖ 
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(Ibid., II 16). Nietzsche posits an interesting consequence as a result when he singles out 
Christianity in particular for its emphasis on interiority and what he calls its popularized 
notion of a bad conscience. Under the influence of Christianity‘s concept of original sin, one 
who expresses ressentiment by ascribing an ontological identity of evil to an external enemy 
finally learns to redirect that sense of hatred at oneself too. A sentiment of ―The so-called 
strong and powerful - the evil and damned- are to blame for my suffering!‖ becomes ―Alas, I 
am to blame as well! God forgive me – I am a sinner! Man is a sinner!‖ The bad conscience 
gives rise, Nietzsche thinks, to a guilt-ridden pain over the mere fact of existing, and the pain 
subsequently supplements the guilt of existing and justifies itself as deserved and necessary 
on the basis of this guilt (Ibid.). 
Nietzsche obviously bemoans Christianity and theological thought in general for the 
resulting nihilism that he believes has exerted an overwhelming influence on human 
societies, but he is not straightforwardly hateful of these religious propagators as one might 
guess. In a shocking turn, Nietzsche concludes that our history of nihilism, with its emphasis 
on interiority through conscientious deliberation and guilt, is actually to be thanked for 
turning the human subject inward. This inward turn is responsible for making the historical 
subject incomparably more contemplative, self-reflexive, complex and interesting. ―Human 
history would be a dull and stupid thing without the intelligence furnished by its impotents‖ 
(Ibid., I 7). Far from conveying mere hatred for these seeming lowest of the low and thereby 
precluding any ethical relations with their present-day counterparts, the aggressive atheist 
Nietzsche is practically reverent. Nietzsche never relents in his claims that nihilism should be 
 90 
 
defeated, but he is suggesting here that perhaps it can be looked at as a fortuitous event in our 
collective history provided we can overcome its latest incarnations. The present-day 
embodiments of nihilism, by extension, are not sub-human or thing-like objects to be 
dismissed. Nietzsche recognizes their value even though he proposes a different type of 
viewpoint about life. 
Finally, the very purpose of the character of Zarathustra is ethical at its core. That 
Zarathustra ever leaves his solitude to attempt to share his wisdom with the people implies 
the ethical significance of creating life-affirming values – they are intended to in some way 
benefit people as a whole. ―Behold, I am weary of my wisdom, like a bee that has gathered 
too much honey; I need hands outstretched to receive it‖ (Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ Prologue 1). 
Eternal return is not simply about creating personal values so that one may smile every day 
while the rest of the world sinks in its nihilism or burns to ashes. One who has affirmed 
eternal return has the potential to influence society by propagating life-affirming values, 
however contingent they are recognized to be, that can cultivate a greater and healthier love 
of life writ large. The end result, Nietzsche thinks, could be ethically significant for everyone. 
―And learning better to feel joy, we learn best not to hurt others or to plan hurts for them‖ 
(Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ II ―On the Pitying‖). Nietzsche‘s hope is that this, in turn, may help 
teach certain others to learn to do the same. ―Let your gift-giving love and your knowledge 
serve the meaning of the earth‖ (Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ I ―On the Gift-Giving Virtue‖). The 
eternal return seeks to beget creative individualism, certainly, but not egoistic self-absorption. 
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3.9 ETERNAL RETURN AND THE JOYOUS BURDEN OF OVERCOMING A 
HISTORY OF GODS 
If one still feels fear at this juncture, that is not at all necessarily an objection. For all his 
passion about creating, Nietzsche never claims that it will help us overcome history 
unscathed. He recognizes the necessity of terror for a creative voyage into unknown 
territories for us, the descendants of this ―polluted stream‖ called Man (Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ 
Prologue 3), for whom Nietzsche believes the dominance of religions like Christianity has 
long led to the loss of the will to create and a desperate need for values from external sources 
like God (1974, GS §347). Although he insists on those select few who could will the eternal 
return and share with him the sentiment ―I feel only my will‘s delight in begetting and 
becoming‖ (Ibid., 1992, EH ―Why I Write Such Good Books‖ 8), the destruction of so many 
ideas in the name of becoming still encompasses a burden that Nietzsche is all too keen to 
recognize, and one which cannot be alleviated fully. It is, alas, perhaps the greatest weight for 
anyone who is to affirm the eternal return. ―We have abolished the real world: what is left? 
The apparent world perhaps? … But no! With the real world we have also abolished the 
apparent world! (Ibid., 1990, TI ―History of an Error‖). The creation of an atheist world that 
overcomes millennia of theological ideas entails not merely the destruction of past ideas, but 
rather it effaces everything we have come to know and proclaim the world to be. It uproots us 
from our normalized world of values and practices from which our senses of identity and 
stability in the world are internalized. Even with everything we have mentioned about strong 
and weak types and ethical relations, if we are the byproducts of over two thousand years of a 
theologically conditioned philosophy, we are in no position to strongly predict what the more 
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exact features of future humankind would look like if such an extensive and profound 
heritage were gradually replaced. What would it be replaced by? What would life be like in 
such a world where ideas were understood to be extensions of creative wills rather than 
reflections of truth? Moreover, if nihilism has hitherto been such a strong determinant of our 
identities, what could become of us in lieu of any degree of its absence? What would become 
of collective societies? Because such knowledge would presuppose a vantage point beyond 
our historico-culturally conditioned perspectives, the anticipated ramifications extend beyond 
the parameters of our collective capabilities of sophisticated understanding .We cannot speak 
but superficially of what our world would be if we cannot now take on the role of the very 
―we,‖ the very collectivity, that would be constituted in and through such a world. The 
thought therefore presupposes that we become other to ourselves. The terror of the thought is 
not just in its unknowability, but the unknowability that it must make of us. 
Even amidst such terror, a Nietzschean philosophy would finally betray itself if it did not 
confront such burdens with joy rather than bitterness or resignation. ―What happiness even in 
weariness, in the old illness, in the convalescent‘s relapses!‖ (Nietzsche, 1996, HAH Preface 
5). To become a person capable of these burdens of the eternal return means embracing ―Joy 
in the destruction . . . and at the sight of its progressive ruin . . . Joy in what is coming and 
lies in the future, which triumphs over existing things, however good‖ (Nietzsche quoted in 
Arendt, 1978, p. 163, emphasis added). Against the nihilism he perceived in his own time, 
whereby he sensed that ―We no longer see anything these days that aspires to grow greater; 
instead, we have a suspicion that things will continue to go downhill‖ (Nietzsche, 1990, GM 
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II 12), Nietzsche is prescribing joy in the endlessness of becoming in eternal return, even 
amidst the uncertainty (and thus fear) it may engender as it eradicates ideas that we‘ve long 
associated with our identities. 
3.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is not unreasonable to finally ask why anyone should embark on such an uncertain and 
possibly terrifying journey at all. Even if our own age is as nihilistic as Nietzsche felt his to 
be (or worse), why not simply give up and wearily suffer the world as it is? As a reminder, 
that is exactly what Nietzsche believes nihilism leads many to finally do. ―Verily, we have 
become too weary even to die‖ (1976, TSZ II ―The Soothsayer‖). 
Ultimately, there is no philosophy that can make a love of life necessary as a starting 
point for opposing a theological vision of existence – even if one feels along with Nietzsche 
that theology is antithetical to life and breeds nihilism. To rationally ascertain the necessity of 
loving life (and rejecting the world of Being) would not be a type of love that Nietzsche 
could endorse. It would be conditional on the apprehension of a universal truth that would 
therefore be set against life (a return of the two-world doctrine upon which Nietzsche alleges 
that a certain type of truth is predicated). Nietzsche‘s prescribed love of life, rather, is in the 
end just a choice
18
. Nietzsche is offering us his means of choosing it, his means of affirming 
life, but it is us who need to make that choice for ourselves. Nietzsche himself certainly does 
not envision that all people can or will do so, as he makes clear here: 
To ordinary human beings, finally-the vast majority who exist for service and the general advantage, 
and may exist only for that-religion give an inestimable contentment with their situation and 
                                                     
18
 It is a choice insofar as one can choose to commit to a love of life through the eternal return. Obviously, the feeling of 
loving life is much less of a choice if it is one at all. 
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type....Perhaps nothing in Christianity and Buddhism is as venerable as their art of teaching even the 
lowest how to pace themselves through piety in an illusory higher order and thus to maintain their 
contentment with the real order, in which their life is hard enough-and precisely this hardness is 
necessary. [2003, BGE §61] 
No matter how many people may follow Nietzsche‘s method to love life and thereby 
overcome nihilism, for some people a form of theology will continue to serve their interests; 
the dream of higher orders of existence, truth as correct representation, or enduring moral 
rules will be a comfort, a necessity, or both. 
For those of us, however, who feel in our heart of hearts that we wish to ―remain faithful 
to the earth‖ (Nietzsche, 1976, TSZ Prologue 3), our reading of Nietzsche will prove 
essential. If one feels along with Nietzsche that, ―Life is at an end where the ‗kingdom of 
God‘ begins‖ (1990, TI ―Morality as Anti-Nature‖), might it not at least possibly be at a 
sweet new beginning where the kingdom burns? If we fail to read Nietzsche‘s philosophy as 
the most daring and powerful atheism yet, if we fail to embrace the eternal return as the new 
horizon that sweeps clear the ashes of dead gods, it will mean needing to confess in the end 
that Nietzsche is dead – and we have killed him. 
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